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A DIVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR THE 
FEDERAL APPEALS COURTS 
Carl Tobias· 
The 106th Congress seriously considered proposed legislation that could 
profoundly affect the federal appellate courts, and the 107th Congress may well do 
so.
1 The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
which performed a rather comprehensive, albeit incomplete, study of the tribunals, 
recommended this bill as the centerpiece of its report for Congress.2 The 
commissioners prescribed regionally-based adjudicative divisions for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and for the remaining appellate 
courts when the courts increase in size, even as the commission decisively r~ected 
the possibility of splitting the Ninth Circuit into multiple courts. The 
commissioners suggested that each of three divisions, with a majority of the 
division's judges resident in the specific area, exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
appeals from district courts situated there and proposed a Circuit Division that 
would resolve conflicting opinions which the three entities issue. The commission 
asserted that this approach would enhance the consistency and coherence of circuit 
law, promote genuine judicial collegiality and link the appellate forum more 
closely to the region served.4 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas. I wish to thank Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Sue Niehoff for processing this piece and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing 
support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); see also COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR TiiE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPoRT 93 (1998) (providing the 
suggested statute on which senators premised the proposed legislation that they introduced 
in January 1999), available at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/finaUappstruc.pdf [hereinafter 
COMMISSION REPORT]; infra note 3. 
2. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 93; see also WIWAM H. 
REHNQUIST, 1999 YEAR-END REPORT ON TiiE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (1999) (urging Congress 
to give the "recommendations full and complete consideration''). 
3. See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-xi, 29, 41-46, 60-62. Despite 
commission rejection of this prospec~ senators offered a circuit-splitting bill in March 2000. 
See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). Senators and representatives introduced similar propoSlls in 
spring 2001. See S. 346, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1203, 107th Cong. (2001). 
4. See COMt.fiSSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at x, 41-46. 
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The commission deserves substantial credit for carefully evaluating the 
appeals courts and for developing recommendations that constitute a pragmatic 
political compromise. Should the divisional arrangement enable the Ninth Circuit 
to improve the quality of case resolution without disrupting daily operations, the 
organizational scheme might also afford an effective alternative for the other 
appellate courts as they expand. The remedy that the commissioners crafted could 
even be responsive to the dramatic docket growth which has transformed the 
appeals courts from the institutions that the tribunals were only a generation ago. 
However, the commission did not systematically collect, analyze and 
synthesize empirical data that show persuasively, much less definitively, that the 
appellate courts have encountered or now experience difficulties that are 
sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment. Indeed, the commissioners 
forthrightly acknowledged that they lacked adequate time to conduct n 
"statistically meaningful analysis" of the Ninth Circuit, even as the commission 
members found that each of the appeals courts operates efficaciously.5 Those 
candid admissions make particularly compelling the inadvisability of implementing 
solutions which seem as drastic and potentially ineffective as the divisional 
concept. All of these propositions mean that the report and suggestions that the 
commissioners recently issued deserve assessment. This Article undertakes that 
effort. 
I initially trace the historical developments which prompted the 1 OS th 
Congress to authorize the establishment of the Commission on Stmctural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. The paper then scmtinizes the 
entity's report and proposals and determines that the evidence the commission 
marshaled fails to support change that appears as inefficacious as the divisional 
structure in entities, which are as important as the appellate courts. The piece 
concludes by recommending that members of Congress approve additional study 
of the appeals courts and that the Ninth Circuit continue its experimentation with 
measures that promise to improve the appellate system. 
I. AUTHORIZATION OF THE COMMISSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals resulted from protracted, ongoing debate over the wisdom of dividing the 
Ninth Circuit. The origins and development of the prolonged, continuing 
controversy might seem to require relatively little examination in this Article 
because certain, significant aspects of the dispute have been rather thoroughly 
chronicled elsewhere.6 Nevertheless, considerable treatment of the most relevant 
5. See id. at 29, 39. 
6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why /he 
Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a 
Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circ11il-
Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Impoverished]; see generally 
THOMAS E. BAKER, JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE 
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features in the first and second sections of the paper is justified, as that type of 
explanation can infonn understanding of the report and suggestions which the 
commissioners published. 
Since the federal appellate system's creation, Ninth Circuit magnitude-
including its twenty-eight active appeals court judges, 8700 annual filings and 
enonnous geographic scope-has provoked calls for realignment because the 
court's size has purportedly fostered inefficient, disunifonn and erroneous 
appellate decisionmaking.7 The most recent, serious attempts to reconfigure the 
Ninth Circuit commenced during 1983; lawmakers who favor realignment have 
orchestrated numerous campaigns to restructure the court since then.8 
The latest major effort was in 1995, when senators who principally 
represent the jurisdictions of the Pacific Northwest introduced proposed legislation 
that would have divided the Ninth Circuit9 During the initial session of the 104th 
Congress, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee approved a measure 
which would have realigned the court 10 However, the bill's proponents could not 
muster the votes necessary for adoption by the entire Senate and evinced 
willingness to support a compromise recommendation, which would have 
authorized a national commission that would study the appellate courts.11 The 
United States House of Representatives failed to pass substantive legislation which 
would have approved the analysis, but the chamber appropriated $500,000 for an 
assessment 12 
Early in the first session of the 105th Congress, senators and 
representatives offered measures that would have divided the Ninth Circuit or that 
PROBLEMS OF TIIB U.S. CoUR'IS OF APPEALS (1994) [hereinafter BAKER, RATIONING 
JUSTICE]. 
7. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 30-33; see generally NINTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197 (1995) 
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. Senate Bills 2184 and 346 as well as House Bill 1203 
represent the most recent efforts. 
8. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 33-34; see generally Carl Tobias, 
Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REY. 189, 196-214 
(1997) [hereinafter Tobias, Suggestions]. 
9. See S. 956, l04th Cong. (1995); see generally Diannuid F. O'Scannlain, A 
Ninth Circuit Study Commission: Now Wltat?, 57 MONT. L. REv. 313, 313-15 (1996); 
Tobias, Impoverished, supra note 6. 
10. See S. 956; SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 104TH CONG., MARKUP OF S. 956 
(Comm. Print 1995); see generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 7; Jennifer E. Spreng, The 
Icebox Cometh: A Fornier Clerk's View oftlze Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 13 WASH. L. 
REV. 875, 887 {1998). 
11. See 142 CONG. REc. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996); see generally 
Carl Tobias, A Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 
(1996). 
12 See 142 CONG. R.Ec. Hl 1,164, HI 1,859 {daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996); see 
generally Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: Tlte Supreme Court, lite Ninth 
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 409 (1998). 
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would have instituted a federal appeals court study.13 On June 3, 1997, the House of 
Representatives unanimously authorized an evaluation of the appellate system.14 
During August, lawmakers who advocated splitting the Ninth Circuit achieved 
their greatest success when the Senate adopted an appropriations rider which 
would have reconfigured the appellate court. 15 Nonetheless, members of the 
House-including every Democrat and Republican from California as well as 
Representative Henry Hyde (R-III.), Chair of the House Judiciary Committec-
opposed division, and Congress ultimately agreed to a compromise that approved 
. a national examination.16 The measure empowered the Chief Justice of the United 
States to appoint the five members of the commission not later than thirty days 
from November 26th, the date of the statute's enactment. 17 The legislation 
accorded the commissioners ten months to "study the structure and alignment of 
the Federal Court of Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth 
Circuit," and two months to write a report that was to include proposals for such 
"changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious 
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."18 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK 
A. Backgrou11d 
The commission members appeared to discharge conscientiously the 
significant statutory duties which lawmakers had assigned the entity. 19 Throughout 
1998, the commissioners sought considerable public input. During the spring of 
that year, the commission held six public hearings at which eighty - nine witnesses 
testified in major metropolitan areas across the country: Atlanta, Dallas, Chicago, 
New York, Seattle and San Francisco.2° Five of these cities function as the 
headquarters for regional circuits. Atlanta and Dallas serve as the respective 
headquarters of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, which Congress created from the 
fonner Fifth Circuit in 1980, and San Francisco has been, and remains, the 
headquarters of the Ninth Circuit. Seattle would probably be the headquarters of 
13. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908, 
105th Cong. (1997); see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14 (analyzing 
developments in the 105th Congress). 
14. See H.R. 908; 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). 
15. See S. 1022, § 305, lOSth Cong. (1997); 143 CONG. REc. S8041 et seq. 
(daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
16. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2240, 2491 (1997); infra notes 
27-28 and accompanying text. 
17. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
18. Id. § 305(a)(I)(B); see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14 
(analyzing measure). 
19. I rely substantially in tbis subsection on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 1-6. 
20. See id. at 2-3. 
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any new Twelfth Circuit that lawmakers might carve out of the existing Ninth 
Circuit. 
The commissioners also worked quite closely with the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the 
principal research and administrative anus of the federal courts, which senators 
and representatives wisely empowered the commission to consult.21 Indeed, 
several employees of the Judicial Center and of the Administrative Office, who 
served as expert advisors for the commissioners, had actively participated in 
previous assessments that were performed on the federal judicial system. More 
specifically, the commission members drew substantially on the experience of two 
seasoned FJC personnel in designing surveys which the commissioners circulated 
to circuit and district court judges and to ap~llate practitioners seeking their 
viewpoints related to appeals courts' operations. 
The commission as well collected certain statistical information regarding 
the performance and administration of the regional circuits. For example, the 
commissioners gathered material (1) on the percentage of filings which the 
appeals courts accord thorough judicial consideration, especially in the form of 
oral arguments and written dispositions; (2) on the time that the circuits require to 
resolve cases; and (3) on the mechanisms that appellate courts have employed to 
treat the steadily expanding dockets that have dramatically changed the circuits 
from the entities which the appeals courts were even during the 1970s.23 
The commission evaluated all of the information it bad assembled or had 
received and on October 7, 1998, the commissioners published a tentative draft 
report \vith suggestions on which they solicited public input during a month-long 
comment period.24 Numerous individuals and interests that the commission draft 
findings and recommendations would affect offered favorable responses, but a 
substantially greater number of commentors tendered submissions that criticized 
those determinations and proposals. Indeed, people and entities ranging across a 
broad spectrum-as diverse as the American Bar Association, the United States 
Department of Justice, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund and the chief judges of 
seven regional circuits-expressed dissatisfaction.25 After the commissioners 
21. See id. at 3-4; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994) (authorizing the 
Administrative Office); 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (1994) (authorizing the FJC); Pub. L. No. 
105-119, § 305(a)(4)(D) (authorizing the FJC to provide the commission research services 
and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to provide the commission administrative 
services). 
22. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 4. 
23. See id. at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITIEE 109 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. REP.] (suggesting that 
caseload increases have transformed the circuits). 
24. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF 
APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT 3 (1998). 
25. See ABA, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR 
THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998); HARRY EDWARDS ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE 
COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. CoURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 10, 
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examined the public comments, the commission members made comparatively 
minor revisions in the tentative draft document and issued a final report on 
December 18.26 
The final commission report is replete with ironies. The very existence of 
the commission itself is ironic. Had the unanimous United States House of 
Representatives delegation from California and Ninth Circuit Judge Charles 
Wiggins, who served on the House Judiciary Committee during the Watergate 
controversy with Representative Henry Hyde, not prevailed on the Chair of the 
Judiciary Committee, Congress might never have authorized the commission.27 If 
the members of Congress from California and Judge Wiggins had failed to 
intercede with Representative Hyde, the House of Representatives could well have 
followed the lead of the Senate, which in August 1997 adopted fifty-five to forty-
five, along strict political party lines, an appropriations rider that would have 
divided the Ninth Circuit. 28 
The senators, who were the foremost advocates of circuit-splitting and 
who principally represented states situated in the Pacific Northwest, reluctantly 
agreed to a national assessment when they apparently realized that some form of 
study would be a condition precedent to any reconfiguration of the Ninth Circuit. 
Lawmakers struck several important compromises in the appropriations measure, 
which authorized the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals.29 Senatorial proponents of the Ninth Circuit's division 
seemingly insisted that (1) the Chief Justice of the United States, William H. 
Rehnquist, be authorized to name all of the commissioners; (2) that the commission 
consist of only five members; (3) that the commissioners have ten months for 
undertaking the appellate court evaluation and two months for compiling their 
report and suggestions; and ( 4) that the commission have a $900,000 budget to 
complete the analysis.30 
These determinations may have foreordained the result that the 
commissioners would ultimately reach. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose as members 
retired Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White, Sixth Circuit Judge Gilbert S. 
1998); TODD D. TRUE, EARTHJUSTICE LEGAL DEF. FUND, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON 
STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998); U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. 
COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS]. 
26. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I. I rely in the remainder of this 
subsection on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the 
developments described. 
27. See, e.g., Letter from Rep. Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to 
Rep. Robert Livingston, Chair, House Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 5, 1997); Letter 
from Rep. Jeny Lewis et al., Members of Congress from California, to Rep. Harold Rogers, 
Chair, House Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State (Oct. 17, 1997). 
28. See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
29. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2240, 2491 (1997). 
30. See id.; see also Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 205-14 (analyzing the 
measure). 
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Merritt, Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, District Judge William D. 
Browning of Arizona and immediate past American Bar Association President N. 
Lee Cooper.31 This composition suggested that the commissioners would proffer a 
report and proposals that were comparatively solicitous of, or would at least be 
palatable to, the federal judiciary. Congress astutely appropriated quite generous 
resources of $900,000 that theoretically could have enabled the commission to 
conduct a comprehensive assessment32 However, senators and representatives 
assigned the very small number of commissioners a potentially enormous task 
while affordinf them woefully inadequate time to conclude all of the work that 
was entailed.3 For example, the commission had a shorter time period for 
examining the appellate courts than a majority of those circuits requires to resolve 
an appeal,34 as well as somewhat less time and significantly fewer members than 
comparable, earlier entities, such as the Commission on Revision of the Federal 
Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission), the Federal Courts Study 
Committee and the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States.35 These circumstances may have substantially restricted what the 
commissioners could accomplish. 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals carefully attempted to fulfill the onerous statutory responsibilities 
imposed by lawmakers in the extremely limited period that had been provided. 
The commission members gathered substantial, relevant information on the 
appellate courts, broadly solicited public input, identified the most important 
difficulties that the circuits ostensibly are experiencing and developed apparently 
efficacious solutions for those complications. Notwithstanding the commission's 
concerted efforts, its endeavor eventually proved deficient. The commissioners 
ultimately failed to assemble, evaluate and synthesize convincing empirical material 
that showed with adequate certainty that the appellate courts presently encounter 
difficulties problematic enough to warrant treatment, especially with measures that 
appeared as potentially ineffective as the approaches which the commission 
proposed. 
31. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at l, 92. 
32. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305 (b). 
33. See id. § 305(a)(6). 
34. See COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF 
APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 97 tbl. 5 (1998); U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, MEDIAN TIME 
INTERVALS IN CASES TERMINATED AFTER HEARING OR SUBMISSION, BY CIRCUIT DURING THE 
TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DEC. 31, 2000. 
35. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23; JUDICIAL COXF. OF 
THE U.S. CoMM. ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
(1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]; U.S. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT 
APP. SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223, 228-30 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA 
COMM'N]. 
640 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
B. Problems i11 lde11tifying the Problems 
First, and perhaps foremost, the comm1ss1on did not conclusively 
demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit or the remaining appeals courts presently face 
complications that are sufficiently troubling to deserve remediation. The 
commissioners expressly declared in the final report that they found 11no 
persuasive evidence that the Ninth Circuit (or any other circuit, for that matter) is 
not working effectively."36 
The commission capably summarized the various assertions and 
counterclaims which those individuals and interests that favor and oppose Ninth 
Circuit bifurcation have articulated in the protracted, continuing controversy over 
possible division.37 The arguments involve the impacts of the court of appeals' size, 
the substantial geographic jurisdiction of the circuit and the place of this entity 
within the federal appellate system. The commissioners cataloged the principal 
relevant issues but decided against dissecting them in much detail because the 
commission contended that the ideas were readily available in the literature the 
commissioners had scrutinized. 
The commission then canvassed the perspectives of Ninth Circuit judges, 
the consumers of the court's services and additional, knowledgeable observers. 
The commissioners seemed particularly impressed with the opinions espoused by 
numerous members of the United States Supreme Court, four of whom asserted 
that it was "time for a change."38 Associate Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra 
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens generally voiced concerns 
about the capacity of the Ninth Circuit judges to keep abreast of the court's 
jurisprudence, the danger of intracircuit inconsistency in a court which processes 
such an enormous caseload, and the ability of the limited en bane procedure that 
the circuit employs to address disuniformity.39 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who 
shared these and other viewpoints expressed by his colleagues and who 
characterized the divisional concept as better than a mere compromise between 
circuit-splitting champions and proponents of the status quo, claimed that the 
divisional approach appeared "to address head-on most of the significant concerns 
raised about the court and would do so with minimal to no disruption in the 
circuit's administrative structure. ,,40 
36. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 29. 
37. I rely in this paragraph on id. at 34-37. For similar summaries, see SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-11, 16-31; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 928-45; 
Tobias, Impoverished, supra note 6, at 1377-95. 
38. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also infra notes 48-49 
and accompanying text (analyzing surveys of other consumers). 
39. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39; see also infra notes 91, 97, 
132-33 and accompanying text (analyzing similar expressions of concern). 
40. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 2. 
It is unclear why the commission seemed to assign these ideas so much weight. The Justices 
may have no special expertise in appeals court dispute resolution and are relatively removed 
from daily circuit operations. In fairness, much of the Court's current docket comprises 
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The commissioners next explored several standards that they believed 
inform the lengthy, controversial and ongoing regarding the future of the Ninth 
Circuit 41 The commission stated that the contentions propounded by advocates 
and opponents of change include significant objective and subjective constituents, 
which the commissioners carefully surveyed in reaching their detenninations 
related to the court's present circumstances. The commission reviewed "all of the 
available objective data routinely used in court administration to measure the 
performance and efficiency of the federal appellate courts.'AZ However, the 
commissioners forthrightly admitted that they could "not say that the statistical 
criteria tip decisively in one direction or the other.'.43 Although the commission 
found certain discrepancies among the various indicia deployed by assessors when 
evaluating the appeals courts, "differences in judicial vacancy rates, caseload mix, 
and operatin~rocedures make it impossible to attribute them to any single factor 
such as size.' 
The commission observed that subjective considerations, namely the 
consistency and predictability of law, are obviously more difficult to analyi;e "but 
are widely regarded as a high priority for" the appellate courts.45 The 
commissioners frankly aclmowledged that they "could not possibly have 
undertaken a statistically meaningful analysis of opinions as well as unpublished 
dispositions, dissents, and petitions for rehearing en bane to make our O\'m, 
objective determination of how the Ninth Circuit" compares with the remaining 
appeals courts in the truncated time allocated by Congress.46 The commission 
members concomitantly stated that they were aware of certain, relevant literature, 
"including a study that concluded that intracircuit conflict was not characteristic of 
the published opinions of the Ninth Circuit during the mid-1980s.•A7 However, the 
commissioners apparently accorded this evaluation little credence. 
appeals from these courts. Moreover, Justice O'Connor is the Supreme Court member who 
has responsibility for the Ninth Circuit and Justice Kennedy was a judge of the court, while 
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens formerly served on the appeals courts. 
41. I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
42. Id.; see also Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., Tlze Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 51 
MONT. L. REV. 291, 296-99 (1996) (reviewing earlier objective data); Hon. J. Clifford 
Wallace, Tlze Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 941, 942 (1995) (same). 
43. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
44. Id.; see also infra notes 139, 156 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
Ninth Circuit). 
45. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. For analyses of the two 
phenomena, see Aaron H. Caplan, Malthus and the Court of Appeals: Another Former 
Clerk Looks at the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REV. 957, 981-84 (1998); 
Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 
MONT. L. REY. 261, 274-79 (1996). 
46. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. For suggestions that Congress 
allotted the commission little time, see JUSTICE DEPT. CoMMENTS, supra note 25, at 1 and 
Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 191. 
47. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 39 n.93; see also Wallace, supra note 
42, at 943 (remarking on the study); infra note 114 (citing to the study). 
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The commissioners did comment that the surveys, which the commission 
had prepared with the assistance of Federal Judicial Center personnel and had 
circulated to district judges and appellate attorneys in the Ninth Circuit and the 
other appeals courts, asked for these jurists' and lawyers' perspectives and 
experiences as the principal consumers of appeals court decisions.48 Nevertheless, 
the survey results compiled by the commissioners eventually proved to be rather 
inconclusive. For instance, district judges situated in the Ninth Circuit reported 
finding the law sufficiently clear to give the jurists confidence in their 
detenninations on legal questions as frequently as the trial judges' counterparts in 
the remaining appellate courts, but counsel who practice in the Ninth Circuit 
reported "somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting 
outcomes of appeals than lawyers elsewhere.',49 
Of course, the commission assumed that the viewpoints expressed by 
these consumers of Ninth Circuit decisionmaking would be instructive and 
accurate. However, the opinions of certain district court judges and lawyers who 
pursue cases in the Ninth Circuit could be colored by their personal experiences 
and self-interest and possibly by a lack of confidence in, or even a distrust of, the 
appellate bench. Perhaps in recognition that reliance on the Ninth Circuit 
consumers might be vulnerable to criticism, the commissioners candidly remarked 
that "when all is said and done, neither we nor, we believe, anyone else, can 
reduce consistency and predictability to statistical analysis. These concepts are too 
subtle, the decline in quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to 
isolate, to allow evaluation in a freeze-framed moment."50 
Having made this comparatively telling concession and apparently 
appreciating the somewhat tepid character of the support mustered, the 
commissioners, nonetheless, went on to proclaim that in the "common-law system, 
consistency and predictability have to do with the coherence of the law declared 
over time."51 The commission correspondingly observed that because groups of 
three judges working together in panels typically determine the law on an aEpeals 
court, the appellate process places a premium on collegial deliberations. 2 The 
commissioners specifically admitted that collegiality clearly "cannot be quantified 
48. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 39. 
49. Id. at 40; see also Hug, supra note 42, at 303-06 (suggesting that the Ninth 
Circuit is responsive to the consumers ofits services). 
50. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 40. 
51. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 45 (analyzing consistency and 
predictability). For a critique of the ideas in this paragraph, see Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 13 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 377, 393-401 (2000). 
52. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 40. For analyses of collegiality, 
see O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 315 and infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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or measured and [made] no attempt to do so with respect to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals or any other."53 The commission then proceeded to declare its 
judgment that the consistent, predictable, coherent development of 
the law over time is best fostered in a decisional unit that is small 
enough for the kind of close, continual, collaborative decision 
making that "seeks the objective of as much excellence in a group's 
decision as its combined talents, experience, and energy permit."54 
The lack of clarity accompanying the commissioners' identification of 
those complications presently confronted by federal intermediate appellate courts 
is so important that the notions espoused warrant reiteration. The commission initially 
consulted all of the applicable objective data ordinarily employed by assessors of 
federal court administration in evaluating the performance and efficiency of the 
appeals courts and found this material to be inconclusive. The commissioners then 
considered subjective factors, such as consistency, coherence, collegiality, certainty 
and predictability. The commission members conceded that those elements are quite 
difficult to analyze and that the commission lacked adequate time to conduct a 
statistically meaningful assessment of Ninth Circuit decisionmaking to formulate 
its own, objective evaluation of how this particular court operates. Instead, the 
commissioners resorted to, and relied substantially upon, surveys of the 
viewpoints of district judges and appellate practitioners as the primary consumers 
of circuit determinations, although most of the consumers' responses appeared 
relatively uninformative and, in any event, had somewhat limited value because 
they were effectively the opinions of self-interested observers. The commission 
evidenced cogniz.ance of the only systematic examination of Ninth Circuit 
precedent, which found that conflicts did not characterize the published 
determinations of this appeals court in the mid-1980s. However, the 
commissioners claimed that neither the commission nor anybody else could reduce 
uniformity and predictability to very exacting statistical measurement.55 
Undaunted by the paucity of information elicited and the apparent weakness of the 
evidence which the commissioners had adduced, they contended that consistency 
and predictability implicate the coherence oflaw declared by appellate judges over 
time and that group decisionmaking on the appeals courts enhances the importance 
of collegiality. Finally, the commission acknowledged that collegiality obviously 
resists precise quantification or measurement and undertook no effort to quantify 
or calculate the concept's operation in the Ninth Circuit or in the remaining appellate 
courts. Nevertheless, the commissioners declared their unsubstantiated judgment 
that the uniform, predictable and coherent development of the law across time can 
53. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11 at 40; see also Hug, supra note 42, at 
299-300 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is collegial); Spreng, supra note 10, at 922-24 
(suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is not collegial). 
54. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 (quoting FRANK COFFIN, ON 
APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215 (1994)). 
55. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40; see also supra note 50 and 
accompanying text (providing earlier analysis of ideas). 
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be promoted best in a decisional entity that is sufficiently small for the type of 
intimate, ongoin~, collaborative interaction that cultivates excellent appellate 
decisionmaking. 6 Perhaps most striking about this proposition, which constitutes 
the linchpin of the determinations and proposals that the commissioners 
developed, and about numerous other assertions articulated by the commission is 
the sheer lack of support proffered for the notions. Indeed, the commissioners 
explicitly admitted that their comprehensive review of the relevant objective 
information and applicable subjective phenomena-including consistency, 
certainty and collegiality-yielded essentially inconclusive results, particularly in 
terms of attempting to correlate deficient appeals court perfonnance with circuit 
size. In the final analysis, the contentions of the commission that the appellate 
courts were encountering difficulties problematic enough to deserve treatment 
with the divisional arrangement appear as unsubstantiated as the assertions are 
magisterial in their tone. 
C. Problems in Identifying the Solutions 
Once the members of the commission had closely "considered all of the 
arguments, evidence, the many helpful statements that were submitted," as well as 
their own personal experiences, the commission decided to recommend that 
"Congress and the President by statute restructure the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit into three regionally-based adjudicative divisions [and] create a 
Circuit Division for conflict correction to resolve any conflicts that arise from 
different decisions of the three regional divisions. "57 These suggestions reflected 
careful assessment by the commissioners of the circumstances of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals today as well as predictions related to particular appeals court and 
the remaining appellate courts as they increase in magnitude over time. 58 The 
commission proposed that the legislative and executive branches organize the 
Ninth Circuit into three regionally-premised adjudicative divisions which would 
hear and resolve each case appealed from a federal district court in the specific 
division. The commissioners also recommended that senators and representatives 
seriously consider prescribing similar arrangements for the other appellate courts 
as the courts expand during the twenty-first century. 
The commission members suggested that the Northern Division for the 
Ninth Circuit include the Federal Districts of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon and 
56. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 40; see also supra note 54 and 
accompanying text (providing earlier analysis of ideas). 
57. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40. For critiques of the solutions, sec 
Hellman, supra note 51, at 381-93; Federal Courts-Proposed Changes to the Ninth 
Circuit and the Federal Courts of Appeals, 113 HARV. L. REV. 822 (2000). 
58. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41. The commissioners, 
recognizing that Congress might reject their proposal and divide the circuit, analyzed a 
dozen circuit-splitting plans and found that they all lacked merit. The commission then 
scrutinized three "arguable" plans, but it considered them flawed and endorsed none. See id. 
at 52-57; see also HRUSKA COMM'N, supra note 35, at 234-43 (analyzing these and other 
plans); O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 317-19 (same). 
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Eastern and Western Washington.59 The Middle Division proposed would consist 
of the Federal Districts of Eastern and Northern California, Hawaii, Nevada, 
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The Southern Division would encompass 
the Federal Districts of Arizona and Central and Southern California. The 
commissioners recommended that every circuit judge in active status be assigned 
to a particular regional division, that individual divisions be comprised of at least 
seven active appellate judges and that the precise number of divisional members 
be commensurate with applicable caseload requirements in the specific 
divisions.60 The commission concomitantly suggested that a majority of judges 
reside in those federal districts over which their divisions exercised jurisdiction 
but that each of the divisions include some non-resident judges who would be 
stationed there for terms of at least three years. 61 
The commissioners Eroposed that all of the divisions function as semi-
autonomous decisional units. 2 The commission recommended that the judges in 
every division resolve appeals with three-judge panels and sit en bane to discharge 
the responsibilities that Congress presently assigns by statute to an existing court 
of appeals en bane. With the establishment of the divisions, current Ninth Circuit 
precedent would continue to operate as the governing law throughout the circuit; 
only the divisional en bane process within a particular division could overrule 
existing precedents of the Ninth Circuit and divisional decisions. Opinions of one 
division would not bind the remaining divisions; however, the commissioners 
admonished that appellate judges accord the decisions substantial weight as the 
jurists attempt to maintain uniform circuit law. 
The commission specifically conceded that the suggestion for placing large 
portions of California in different divisions might elicit concerns related to forum 
shopping and that the proposal could expose people and entities that must comply 
with California law to potentially divergent federal authority.63 Nonetheless, the 
commissioners asserted that the proposal would not promote markedly greater 
federal forum shopping than currently occurs and that the recommended Circuit 
Division would afford a more expeditious means of resolving inconsistencies 
59. I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 41-44; see 
also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Northern Division would 
resemble the proposed Twelfth Circuit which congressional circuit-splitting proponents 
advocated). 
60. See CoMMISS!ON REPORT, supra note 1, at 43; see also Hug, supra note 42, at 
307 (suggesting that the number of judges authorized for the projected Twelfth Circuit by 
proposed legislation in the 104th Congress would not have been commensurate with 
caseload demands). 
61. See COMI\fiSSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43. 
62. I rely in this paragraph on id. 
63. I rely in this paragraph on id. at 43-44; see also HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra 
note 35, at 23HO (earlier study suggesting that Congress place C3lifomia's federal 
districts in different circuits); see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing 
a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1195 (1974). 
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attributable to forum shopping.64 The commission explained that, once a particular 
regional division speaks on an issue of law, the district courts over which the 
specific division has jurisdiction would be bound by the determination, 
notwithstanding decisions of other divisions.65 However, the commissioners 
claimed that their contemplated Circuit Division should guarantee that 
disuniformity regarding questions important to circuit-wide consistency would not 
persist for a prolonged period.66 The commission elaborated the concept of the 
Circuit Division "for conflict correction, whose sole mission would be to resolve 
conflicting decisions between the regional divisions."67 The entity would consist 
of thirteen judges, including the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit and twelve active 
appellate judges chosen by lot in equal numbers from the three regional divisions.68 
The Circuit Division would have discretionary jurisdiction, which a party to a case 
could invoke after a panel determination in a particular division had received 
divisional en bane review or the litigant had requested, and the division had denied, 
such review.69 The jurisdiction of the Circuit Division would encompass those 
appeals that the entity concludes raise "square interdivisional conflicts."70 The 
Circuit Division would lack authority to consider an allegedly unsound or 
incorrect decision issued by a regional division; only the regional division en bane 
or the United States Supreme Court could review such a determination.71 The 
suggestion proposed by the commissioners would abolish the circuit-wide en bane 
process and the special statutory provision for limited en bane panels in appeals 
courts with more than fifteen active circuitjudges.72 
The regional divisions would function pursuant to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure as well as those local circuit rules and internal operating 
procedures promulgated by the court of appeals, but individual regions would not 
64. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-44; see also Diarmuid 
O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split is Inevitable, But Not Imminent, 56 OHIO ST. L. J, 947, 
950 (1995) (analyzing similar ideas). For trenchant critiques of the commission decision to 
place California in different divisions, see Los ANGELES COUNIT BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS 
TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 4, 
1998); SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Oct. 23, 1998). 
65. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. 
66. See id. 
67. I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on id. at 45-46; see also infra notes 
82-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the jurisdiction that the commission would afford 
the Circuit Division). 
68. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45; see also infra note 135 and 
accompanying text (suggesting a similar approach). 
69. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
70. Id. 
71. See id.; see also infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
jurisdiction that the commission would afford the Circuit Division). 
72. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46; see also Act of Oct. 20, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (authorizing circuits to apply the limited 
en bane process); 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (implementing the limited en bane process); infra notes 
96-97 and accompanying text (analyzing consumer views of the limited en bane process). 
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be allowed to prescribe their own distinctive local rules or internal operating 
procedures.73 Local rules that the court of appeals adopts would correspondingly 
govern administration of the Circuit Division. 
D. Problems witlt tlte Solutions Proposed 
Despite the commissioners' good faith efforts to analyze the most 
compelling problems that the Ninth Circuit and the remaining appeals courts 
purportedly encounter and to formulate responsive solutions, the remedial scheme 
that the commission recommended might well prove ineffective. One crucial reason 
for this apparent inefficacy is that the federal appellate judiciary has never actually 
implemented the divisional approach suggested by the commissioners. 
Nevertheless, during the late 1970s, two appeals courts did conduct 
comparatively limited experimentation with mechanisms somewhat analogous to the 
commission's divisional arrangement The Fifth Circuit briefly applied a divisional 
concept under which the "rules of stare decisis behind the concept of the law of 
the circuit became so complicated that they nearly defied description." The Ninth 
Circuit employed for five months a regional calendering system that members of 
the appellate court thought reduced judicial collegiality, threatened the coherence 
of circuit law, encouraged counsel and parties to forum shop, saved the jurists 
relatively little travel time and led circuit members who were "accustomed to 
sitting with a larger and more diverse group of judges" to experience "panel 
fever."74 Insofar as it is possible to predict exactly how the commission divisional 
scheme will work in practice, the remedy would seemingly be infeasible. This 
proposal might even exacerbate the precise difficulties that the solution was 
designed to rectify and, therefore, have effects that diametrically oppose the goals 
the commission members intended to achieve. Indeed, the divisional organization 
may well have been flawed in its conceptualization. 
A :fundamental, ·specific complication with the commissioners' 
recommendation was their decision to jettison the longstanding, effective concept 
of circuit-wide stare decisis.75 The commission expressly and forcefully 
73. I rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 46-47. 
74. THOMAS E. BAKER, COMMENTS TO THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS (Nov. 2, 1998) (analyzing Fifth Circuit); 
see also Public Hearing Before Comm'n on Structural Alterantivcs for the Fed. Courts of 
Appeal (May 29, 1998) (statement of James R. Browning, U.S. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) (analyzing Ninth Circuit); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
1, at 50 (same and affording Ninth Circuit quotation). Panel fever is the discomfort that 
judges experience when they sit with a smaller, Jess diverse group of judges. 
75. I rely here and in the remainder of this subsection on ARTHUR D. HEU.MAN, 
COMMENTS TO TiiE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF 
APPEALS (Nov. 4, 1998); Hellman, supra note 51; HON. PROCTER R. HUG, JR., Co:-.tMENTS 
TO THE CoMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURT OF APPEALS (Oct. 27, 
1998); Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Stroct11ral Altematfres for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of tlze Commission's Recommendations for 
the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 887 (1999) [hereinafter Hug, Analysis]. 
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acknowledged the importance of maintaining uniform federal law related to 
matters such as the commercial and maritime regime that governs relations with 
the countries of the Pacific Rim, which significantly affect the entire Pacific region 
and the western United States.76 However, this laudable objective would be 
frustrated under a system in which the determinations issued by a particular 
division would have no binding effect on the other two divisions. The commission 
did contemplate that the members of each division would accord the remaining 
divisions' opinions "substantial weight as the judges of the circuit endeavor to 
keep circuit law consistent."77 Divisional members could often do so in the same 
manner as appeals court judges, who currently respect decisions which other 
circuits publish. Nonetheless, suggesting that appellate court members defer to 
precedent is different from requiring the jurists to follow case law, and this 
distinction will operate when the difference is most salient. 
Today, three-judge panels of the regional circuits occasionally distinguish 
precedents in a manner unconvincing to their colleagues on the appeals or district 
court bench or unpersuasive to attorneys who practice before the federal courts, 
although this happens rather infrequently.78 Moreover, most appellate judges 
follow precedents with which they may actually disagree because the jurists 
believe that they are obligated to exercise deference. The abandonment of circuit-
wide stare decisis could make it easier for judges to disregard precedent that 
applies in the remaining divisions. The commission recommendation, accordingly, 
would authorize, and might even invite, inconsistent intracircuit decisionmaking. 
The development by the commissioners of a Circuit Division that would 
treat interdivisional conflicts may be insufficiently responsive to the dilemma of 
inconsistency, and the approach proffered seemingly fails to clarify several unclear 
issues.79 Notwithstanding commission protestations to the contrary, the 
commissioners' contemJ>lated mechanism would actually establish another tier in 
the appellate judiciary.80 Because the commission's suggested statute would 
expressly authorize the Circuit Division to review final decisions of the three 
regional divisions, the Circuit Division would not simply be a replacement for the 
existing limited en bane procedure, as the commissioners contend.81 The en bane 
tribunal presently reviews the determination of the federal district court, not the 
judgment of the three-judge panel. 
76. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 49-50; see also Hug, supra note 
42, at 298 (expressing similar sentiments). 
77. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 43; see also Wallace, supra note 42, at 
944 (expressing similar sentiments). 
78. I rely in this paragraph on Hellman, supra note 45, at 277-78; HELLMAN 
COMMENTS, supra note 75. 
79. I rely in this paragraph on HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75. 
80. See id.; see also HUFSTEDLER COMMENTS, supra note 64 (providing similar 
views); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 45-46 (providing the commission view). 
81. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at45, 94-95. 
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Perhaps most troubling is the commission designation of the jurisdiction 
that would be exercised by the Circuit Division. The commissioners would restrict 
the Circuit Division to resolving "square interdivisional conflicts.'.82 This 
delineation apparently means that the Circuit Division could only review decisions 
of a panel in one division which expressly refused to follow the determinations of 
another division. If the proposition above is accurate, the jurisdictional grant that 
the commission members envisioned would not empower the Circuit Division to 
address tensions in circuit law, which are attributable to less patent conflicts in 
results or doctrines, a procedure that the Ninth Circuit currently follows.83 
However, if a particular panel need not specifically reject the ruling of a 
second division to invoke Circuit Division jurisdiction, this jurisdictional 
arrangement would encourage counsel and parties to participate in incessant 
argumentation, which implicates the meaning of inconsistency, and could 
correspondingly foster unwarranted, expensive and time-consuming satellite 
litigation involving comparatively refined distinctions. Considerable practical 
experience with a somewhat analogous system of appellate review in the Florida 
state court system fosters understanding of the difficulties that might materialize 
were the Ninth Circuit to implement the jurisdictional scheme recommended by 
the commissioners. The Florida Supreme Court is authorized to review a judgment 
of a district court of appeals when the opinion "expressly and directly conflicts 
with a decision of another district court of appeals ... on the same question of 
law."84 Several legal commentators have characterized the jurisdictional 
mechanism as disputatious and have determined that the presence of an 
inconsistency can frequently be uncertain, which means that briefs filed by 
attorneys and parties must present a "lengthier and more convoluted argument to 
establish the Court's discretion over the case.',ss Thus, although the 
commissioners' Circuit Division concept may not necessarily be a prescription for 
disaster, one expert student of the Ninth Circuit has astutely observed that the 
approach envisioned is hardly a model to be emulated, while another scholar of the 
court perceptively remarked that he was less sanguine than the commission that 
the differences between review of panel decisions for conflict resolution or review 
because of importance or mistake are "easily made and readily distinguishable.,.s6 
The articulation that the commissioners proposed concomitantly leaves 
unclear the scope of Circuit Division jurisdiction over those appeals the panel 
82. Id. at 45; cf. JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25 (analyzing the tcnn's 
meaning). 
83. See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane); 
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (en bane); see 
generally Hug, Analysis, supra note 75, at 907. 
84. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b}(3). 
85. Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, The Operation and Jurisdiction of the 
Florida Supreme Court, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1151, 1238 (1994). 
86. HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75 (affording the view of the first scholar 
that the approach is not to be emulated); see also BAKER COMMENTS, supra note 74 
(affording the views of the second scholar who was less sanguine than the commission). 
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chooses to entertain.87 If the Circuit Division can only consider the particular issue 
that produced the conflict, resolution might then be complicated by examination of 
the specific matter apart from the remaining questions involved in the case. 
However, could the Circuit Division resolve all of the issues that the appeal 
presents, the entity would have expansive authority to enunciate circuit law for 
questions that did not implicate the interdivisional inconsistency. 
The commission suggestions that Congress eliminate the provision for 
the circuit-wide limited en bane court and empower the three recommended 
divisions to conduct en bane hearings may correspondingly have certain 
detrimental effects.ss The requirement that parties request regional en bane 
reconsideration before litigants seek Circuit Division review would postpone 
ultimate appellate resolution and impose additional, unnecessary cost and delay. 
Moreover, the regional en bane mechanism, by stamping an opinion with the 
imprimatur of a particular division's judges, could solidify the divisional view 
regarding a specific issue and, therefore, frustrate efforts to reattain uniformity 
throughout the circuit. Perhaps the most ironic feature of the commissioners' 
elegant divisional arrangement is that the approach constitutes the consummate 
political compromise, even as the commission members clearly and powerfully 
disavowed the relevance of politics to their report and proposals to the Ninth 
Circuit and to the entire system: 
There is one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to 
realign circuits (or not realign them) and to restructure courts (or 
leave them alone) because of particular judicial decisions or 
particular judges. This rule must be faithfully honored, for the 
independence of the judiciary is of constitutional dimension and 
requires no less. 89 
E. Problems with the Justificatio11s for the Solutions Proposed 
The central premise of the assessment performed by the commission was 
that "large appellate units have difficulty developing and maintaining consistent 
and coherent Iaw."90 The commissioners grounded this critical proposition on 
unspecified "perceptions of greater inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit than in most 
[of the remaining appeals courts, which confirmed the members' own 
unelaborated] judgment, based on experience," and on the combined volume of 
decisions produced and on the judicial workload, which "make it impossible for 
all of the court's judges to read all of the court's published opinions when they are 
87. I rely in this paragraph on HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75. 
88. See JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25; supra note 72 and 
accompanying text. 
89. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 6; see generally SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 8-9, 25-27; Caplan, supra note 51; Herald, supra note 12; O'Scannlain, 
supra note 9. 
90. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47. 
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issued.',91 Especially troubling factors about the commission's assessment were 
the dearth of particularity attending the commission perceptions, the lack of 
elaboration on the commissioners' personal experiences and the unsubstantiated 
assumptions that reviewing every detennination upon its publication is the only 
way to keep fully informed of circuit precedent and that honoring this practice 
would ineluctably foster uniformity and coherence. Procter R. Hug, Jr., who 
served as the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit from 1996 until 2000, incisively 
characterized as a "relic of the pre-computer era" the notion that appellate court 
members cannot stay abreast of circuit law unless they scrutinize all of the court's 
opinions when the determinations issue.92 
Similarly problematic were the commission's closely-related contentions 
that ')udges operating in the [suggested] smaller decisional units .•. will find it 
easier to monitor the law in their respective divisions and that those smaller 
decisional units will thus promote greater consistency."93 Under the regime 
recommended by the commissioners, judges should be able to follow more closely 
intradivisional precedent; however, it remains unclear how the jurists can preserve 
and increase circuit-wide uniformity without tracking the decisions published by 
members of all three divisions. In short, the judges would not experience reduced 
workloads because they would have to read the identical number of opinions. 
The commission also asserted that appellate judges serving on larger 
decisionmaking units encounter difficulties maintaining consistent and predictable 
circuit precedent because they have fewer opportunities to sit together as the size 
of the decisional entity increases.94 Nonetheless, the commission proffered no 
persuasive evidence that more frequent interactions among circuit members, or 
that appellate courts with smaller judicial complements, would foster enhanced 
uniformity or predictability in the circuit's law. 
Indeed, the only systematic evaluation of precedent's operation in the 
Ninth Circuit contradicts the core proposition enunciated by the commissioners. 
The commission effectively chose to deemphasize the analysis but rejected neither 
the methodology of the study nor its conclusions.95 Quite troubling is the fact that 
the major idea underlying the commission proposals apparently lacks much 
support, particularly when the commission essentially ignored the most relevant, 
albeit contradictory, information and could have rather readily assembled, 
assessed and synthesized other applicable material. Illustrative is the notion that 
substantial appeals courts experience problems developing and preserving 
91. Id.; see also O'Scannlain, supra note 9, at 315-16 (providing similar ideas). 
92. HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; see Letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug, 
Jr., to Justice Byron R. White (Aug. 29, 1998). 
93. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47; but see Los ANGELES COUNTY 
BARAsS'N COMMENTS, supra note 64; JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25. 
94. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 47; see also O'Scannlain, supra 
note 9, at 315 (providing similar ideas). 
95. See supra notes 47, 55 and accompanying text; Hellman, supra note 51, at 
397-98. 
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consistent and coherent circuit law. The claim of inconsistency could be 
empirically tested by comparing precedent in the larger and smaller appellate 
courts. 
The commission supplied no greater substantiation for the conclusion that 
the limited en bane procedure employed by the Ninth Circuit during the last two 
decades apparently precludes the effective discharge of the court's en bane 
responsibilities. The commissioners frankly acknowledged that only a minority of 
Ninth Circuit judges registered dissatisfaction with reliance on the limited en bane 
technique to afford federal district judges and attorneys guidance, to correct 
erroneous panel determinations, to resolve conflicts in circuit law, and to prevent 
intercircuit inconsistency, while judges who serve on several other a1meals courts, 
a few of which are small, reported similar or greater discontent.96 Efforts to 
analyze additional commission criticisms of the limited en bane mechanism are 
frustrated because the commissioners merged their treatment of conflict resolution 
and the correction of improper district court decisionmaking, even though such 
responsibilities have very different ramifications for structural reform. Even had 
the commission been clearer, some of the entity's contentions seem vulnerable to 
attack. For instance, the commission members identified dissatisfaction with 
respect to the infrequency of en bane rehearings vis-a-vis the perceived necessity 
for reconsideration as well as the magnitude of the limited en bane court and the 
manner in which this tribunal is constituted.97 However, the Ninth Circuit could 
rather felicitously treat these criticisms by rehearing a larger number of cases or by 
modifying the en bane court's composition without dismantling the comparatively 
efficacious limited en bane process or risking the disru?ition and ineffectiveness 
that the untested Circuit Division might entail. 8 The commissioners 
correspondingly asserted that the divisional structure would relieve each judge of 
having to monitor the decisional output of the entire Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless, 
members of the court who fail to remain abreast of circuit precedent may 
encounter complications fostering the increased uniformity and coherence that, 
according to the commission members, are indispensable attributes of appeals 
courts. 
96. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 23-25 ( 1998); see also 
Hellman, supra note 45, at 280-82 (analyzing the limited en bane). For analyses which 
suggest that the limited en bane works well, see Caplan, supra note 45, at 972-74 and 
Herald, supra note 12, at 476-81. 
97. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; see a/so SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 10 (expressing similar dissatisfaction); Conrad Burns, Dividing the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals: A Proposition Long Overdue, 51 MONT. L. REV. 244, 252 (1996) 
(same); infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text (suggesting possibly salutary changes in 
the limited en bane). 
98. Indeed, the court has endorsed expansion of the en bane court's membership 
and reduction of the votes needed to take a case en bane, actions which might increase the 
number of en bane decisions. See NINTii CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 2-6 
(2000) (hereinafter EVALUATION COMM. INTERIM REPORT); Senate Bill 1403, 106th Cong. 
(1999), which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) introduced, embodies these ideas. 
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The commissioners also maintained that the divisional nrrangement, 
which would incorporate divisions comprising resident and nonresident judges, 
would respect and heighten the regionalism, considered to be a desirable aspect of the 
appellate system, without forfeiting the benefits of diversity provided by a tribunal 
constituted from a significantly larger area.99 The commissioners further contended 
that the divisional approach would capitalize on the full contingent of Ninth 
Circuit judges, while restoring a sense of connection between the circuit and the 
regions within the circuit by insuring that a majority of each division's members 
resides in the jurisdictional geographic area.100 The commission, therefore, 
assumed that regionalism is a positive feature which has been historically 
deemphasized, and even lost, by the Ninth Circuit, and which warrants facilitation, 
if not restoration. However, that phenomenon may have dwindling importance, 
and could be irrelevant, in an era of rapidly escalating internationalization and 
computerization. The promotion of regionalism correspondingly conflicts, or at 
least is in tension, with the conscientious discharge of the significant circuit 
federalizing responsibility: the duty to reconcile the federal Constitution and 
federal legislation as well as state and local policies.101 Furthermore, the 
commission members asserted that having one appellate court construe and apply 
federal law in the western United States is a strength of the Ninth Circuit which 
should be preserved and fostered, 102 but the divisional concept could increase 
disuniformity across the region because the concept would effectively create three 
appeals courts and because the precedent that any of the divisions articulates 
would have no binding effect on the others. 
The commissioners bolstered their suggestions by explaining how the 
recommendations are preferable to the alternative system preferred by Chief Judge 
Hug in response to the commission tentative draft report.103 The Chief Judge 
concurred with the commission proposal calling for the establishment of three 
divisions but suggested that the entities be comprised exclusively of resident 
judges and that they have no discrete adjudicative role.164 The commissioners 
characterized this recommendation as antithetical to their own approach, the 
essence of which is a regionally-premised adjudicative unit that is small, stable 
99. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48; see also Caplan, s11pra note 
45, at 965-71 (analyzing numerous benefits that a large circuit affords); Wallace, supra 
note 42, at 944 (analyzing diversity that a large circuit affords). 
100. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 48-49. The court has instituted 
efforts that respond to the concerns regarding regionalism. See infra note 140 and 
accompanying text 
101. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 
1994); John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980). 
For analyses of similar ideas, see Caplan, supra note 45, at 960-65 and Spreng, supra note 
10, at 945-47. 
102. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-50; see also Hug, supra note 
42, at 300 (expressing similar sentiments). 
103. See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; see also COMMISSION REPoRT, supra 
note 1, at 51-52 (analyzing Chief Judge Hug's proposal). 
104. See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75. 
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and autonomous enough to operate effectively as an appellate decisional body and 
which has responsibility for the law applicable within the region. The commissioners 
criticized the proposal developed by Chief Judge Hug because attorneys and 
members of the divisions would have to monitor panel opinions throughout the 
circuit, even though the commission arrangement could well have this impact. 105 
The commissioners also claimed that the Chief Judge's suggestion regarding panel 
constitution would overvalue regionalism by requiring all panels to have n 
majority of their membership drawn from the particular appellate region and 
would underemphasize regional connection by having a regionally composed 
panel determination subject to circuit-wide rehearing en banc.106 Chief Judge 
Rug's recommendation, therefore, purportedly would advance neither the 
regionalizing nor the federalizing responsibilities deemed important by the 
commission members, which their formulation expressly sought to harmonize. 107 
In the final analysis, the commissioners' identification of the 
complications ostensibly plaguing the Ninth Circuit was insufficiently convincing 
to sustain the type of far-reaching and potentially disruptive solutions prescribed. 
The futures of this court and of the appellate system are too crucial to warrant 
significant change without clear, persuasive substantiation. When the legislative 
and judicial branches make critical decisions about the circuits, Congress and the 
courts should not permit generalized perceptions, the commissioners' unelaborated 
experiences and the unsupported opinions of self-interested individuals to replace 
empirical data, which independent, expert evaluators systematically collect, 
scrutinize and synthesize.108 
F. Reasons for Problems with the Commission Report 
A number of phenomena frustrate attempts to pinpoint exactly why the 
endeavors of the commissioners ultimately proved to be inadequate. One essential 
obstacle is that much of the activity undertaken by the commissioners proceeded 
in private. For example, many commission meetings were not open to the public, 
and communications involving the commissioners and the commission staff were 
private. In fairness, the important, controversial and sensitive character of the tasks 
performed and the need to promote frank interchange among the commissioners 
and between them and their expert advisors might have required secrecy. The 
105. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 51 (emphasis in original); see also 
supra note 93 and accompanying text (suggesting that the commission arrangement could 
have this impact). 
106. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis in original). 
107. See id.; see also supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (analyzing the 
two duties). 
108. See, e.g., HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75; Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1925, 1927-29 (1989); see also Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and impact of Rule 
11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943 (1992) (compiling, and suggesting the importance of, empirical 
data); infra notes 114-32 and accompanying text (affording a number of suggestions for 
additional study). 
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commission did implement certain useful actions, such as the establishment of a 
website, to help inform the public while the entity accumulated some instructive 
material on the operations of the federal appellate courts. 
Despite these circumstances, one can delineate several reasons for the 
insufficiency of the report and proposals submitted by the commissioners. Most 
significantly, Congress allotted the commission remarkably little time to finish an 
enormous project For instance, the commissioners had a shorter period to 
complete their study than numerous appellate courts consume in deciding appeals. 
The time limitation could have seriously hampered commission efforts to 
assemble, assess and synthesize substantial amounts of relevant empirical 
information. Moreover, lawmakers apparently assigned the entity an unclear 
statutory mandate and authorized an inadequate number of commissioners to 
complete all of the work necessary. For example, Judge Gilbert Merritt and Judge 
Pamela Rymer continued to fulfill their ongoing, substantial obligations as 
members of the appellate court bench throughout the year when they discharged 
the onerous responsibilities imposed as active participants on the commission. The 
brief time span prescribed and the relatively few commissioners provided may 
have precluded the entity's deployment of subcommittees, which forerunners of 
the commission, such as the Federal Courts Study Committee and the Hruska 
Commission, seemed to use rather effectively. The comm1ss1oners 
correspondingly could have conceptualized the project somewhat differently and 
could have accomplished considerably more with the generous financial resources 
appropriated by senators and representatives. For instance, legal scholars might 
have conducted empirical analyses by extensively interviewing appeals court 
judges for ideas on consistency, district court judges for perspectives on coherence 
and appellate attorneys for opinions on the decreased procedural opportunities that 
the circuits currently afford. The academicians might also have attempted to evaluate 
specific cases, from the time when counsel and parties filed the appeals until they 
received disposition, to determine whether appellate courts resolved the cases 
uniformly, coherently, expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly. Nevertheless, 
temporal restraints probably restricted many of the activities suggested. 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit and other courts may simply not be 
experiencing difficulties that are problematic enough to require remediation with 
solutions as potentially drastic as the divisional organization proffered by the 
commissioners. Indeed, the commissioners forthrightly acknowledged that they 
found Ninth Circuit administration to equal operations in the remaining appellate 
courts, all of which now function efficaciously. However, the commission 
members apparently considered Ninth Circuit case law to be insufficiently 
consistent and coherent, certainty and predictability to be inadequate, federalization 
and regionalism to be unsatisfactory and judges not to be collegial enough. 
656 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:3 
ID. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introduction 
The legislative and judicial branches might pursue several courses of 
action. Lawmakers and judges have closely assessed, and must continue to 
scrutinize, the commission report and recommendations.109 Legislators, individual 
appeals courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit, and the appellate system should 
implement any measures that will (1) facilitate unifonn, coherent, prompt, 
economical and equitable case disposition, (2) foster certainty and predictability, (3) 
promote collegiality, and (4) suitably rationalize federalization and regionalism 
while comporting with efficacious circuit administration. Numerous members of 
Congress may believe that they must accede to the independent, expert entity 
which lawmakers authorized, because the commissioners and the expert 
commission staff spent twelve months analyzing the complications encountered by 
the appeals courts and fashioning remedies for the difficulties they detected. 
Nonetheless, the dearth of convincing empirical data that underlies the commission 
findings and proposals as well as the dramatic, controversial nature of the approach 
developed suggest that acquiescence is not warranted. 
Senators and representatives must ascertain more conclusively whether the 
circuits do or will experience problems sufficiently troubling to deserve treatment. 
If lawmakers so determine, they should identify those complications precisely, 
survey the broadest practicable range of salutary solutions for present and 
anticipated difficulties, and tailor remedies to the problems delineated in particular 
courts and across the appellate system. Legislators must exercise caution because 
the future of the circuits is at issue. For example, insofar as Congress is unsure 
about the complications that courts currently or will face, or about the 
effectiveness of the recommendations proposed by the commission or others, 
Congress might want to defer action, evaluate the prospect of more sttidy or 
approve circuit experimentation with promising refonns. To the extent that 
lawmakers have lingering concerns, they must reject extreme or irrevocable 
solutions, including certain structural and systemic remedies, and preserve 
flexibility to prescribe diverse approaches. 
Legislators should also consult the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, which serves as the policymaking arm for all of the federal courts, the 
Circuit Judicial Councils, which are the governing bodies in the twelve regional 
109. I emphasize Congress because the legislative branch must authorize most 
actions. However, courts can institute some actions without legislative authorization, and 
Congress should consult judges. See infra notes 110-11, 143 and accompanying text. The 
Senate and House held hearings on the commission's report in 1999. See infra note 113. 
However, neither body took additional fonnal action on the bill embodying the commission 
proposals during the 106th Congress and, thus, each must continue its study. See supra note 
3. 
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circuits and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, llD as 
well as individual appellate and district court judges. The institutions and jurists 
have substantial, relevant expertise respecting the day-to-day operations of the 
federal judicial system, while Third Branch cooperation will be instrumental to the 
effective implementation of those specific measures that senators and 
representatives may choose to authorize. For instance, Chief Judge Hug's 
comprehensive comments on the proposals, inserted by the commission in the 
October tentative draft report, sharpened important issues for legislative 
examination. The commissioners also expressly admonished Congress to seek 
guidance from Ninth Circuit judges when finalizing the details of any divisional 
arrangement which lawmakers might adopt 111 
The commission seemingly detennined that the Ninth Circuit now 
encounters certain difficulties, which principally implicate circuit law's 
consistency, coherence, certainty and predictability as well as judicial collegiality, 
regionalism and appellate justice. The commissioners apparently considered the 
particular complications that they delineated so problematic as to require 
application of the divisional concept However, the evidence that the commission 
adduced did not definitively show that the circumstances in the Ninth Circuit are 
dire enough to warrant effectuation of the divisional scheme or that the 
recommendation's implementation would significantly improve operations in the 
Circuit 
These propositions indicate that legislators should evaluate several means 
of proceeding. The United States Senate and House of Representatives, through 
the respective Judiciary Committees, have assessed, and could continue to 
analyze, the commission's report and suggestions to ascertain whether the findings 
and proposals proffered can support legislative action. Both chambers have 
sought, and might in the future solicit, additional public input, especially from 
federal appeals and district court judges and appellate lawyers, on the 
commissioners' endeavors. However, the views expressed to date have resembled 
the ideas solicited by the commission with surveys and are vulnerable to similar 
criticisms, namely that the perspectives constitute the opinions of people who may 
be self-interested and only reflect their individual experiences.112 The Judiciary 
Committees in the Senate and the House could undertake independent 
investigations of the questions that were crucial to the commissioners' recently-
completed assessment Moreover, Congress bas employed, and might continue to 
use, the proposed legislation incorporating the recommended commission statute, 
110. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 331-32 (1994); see generally John W. Oliver, 
Reflections on the History of Circuit Judicial Councils and Circuit Judicial Conferences, 64 
F.R.D. 201 (1974) (discussing the history of the Circuit Judicial Councils); Jack B. 
Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemala'ng Procedures, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 905 
(1976) (discussing the rulemaking power of the federal courts). 
111. See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75. But see COMMISSION REroR.T, supra 
note 1, at 51-52; supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text. For the commissioners' 
admonition, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 42. 
112. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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which Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) 
introduced during January 1999, 113 to explore applicable issues, reconsider the 
factual detenninations made by the commissioners and refine the commission 
suggestions. 
Nevertheless, attempts to discern whether the commissioners correctly 
found that the Ninth Circuit situation is sufficiently troubling to deserve 
remediation and, if so, whether the commission solutions will prove efficacious, 
will be inconclusive without further evaluation. Those circumstances exist 
primarily because the commissioners depended substantially on the members' 
personal experiences and on the opinions of appellate and district court judges as 
well as appellate attorneys in identifying putative difficulties, rather than 
systematically gathering, analyzing and synthesizing the maximum possible 
quantity of applicable empirical data. The clarification, if not the definitive 
resolution, of some unclear issues integral to the commission findings and 
proposals must await the collection, scrutiny and synthesis of more empirical 
material and comparatively exacting measurements. Illustrative factors are 
whether Ninth Circuit case precedent is disunifonn or incoherent, whether the 
court's appellate judges are uncollegial or whether the circuit fulfills its en bane 
responsibilities ineffectively and, if so, whether any deficiencies detected correlate 
with the court's substantial magnitude.1'4 A related, important question, namely 
the efficacy of the divisional construct proffered, cannot be conclusively answered 
until the federal judiciary has actually applied, and evaluators have closely 
analyzed, that unprecedented approach. 
Several of these and other significant matters appear to resist very precise 
definition or calculation, to implicate subjective or political judgments, or to 
involve choices among multiple, often competing, values. However, 
systematically-assembled empirical data could infonn understanding of quite a 
few issues. For example, the meaning of collegiality and the concept's 
measurement remain relatively elusive, despite the assiduous efforts of numerous 
113. See supra note I. Each house held July 1999 hearings that elicited few new 
ideas but took no other formal action in the 106th Congress. OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON THE 
FINAL REPORT OF TifE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF 
APPEALS BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. OVERSIGHT & THE COURTS 
(1999); OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY SUBCOMM. 
ON COURTS & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1999). Circuit-splitting bills were offered in March 
2000 and February and March 2001. See supra note 3. 
114. Illustrative is Professor Hellman's careful work on consistency and related 
issues. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large 
Circuit, in R.EsTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THB 
FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (hereinafter 
Hellman, REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE]; Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common -
Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D. 
Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large 
Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989). 
2001) DIVISIONAL ARRANGEMENT 659 
circuit judges to illuminate the notion. 115 Consistency and coherence, which by 
definition must be calibrated over time, are somewhat unclear. The ideas can be 
rather subjective and require careful assessment through, for instance, the 
meticulous comparison of appeals' factual and legal premises.116 Certainty and 
predictability seem relatively ephemeral, defy exact calculation and entail an 
element of subjectivity. 
Ascertaining the accuracy of commission contentions that both the 
smaller decisionmaking units and the divisions recommended by the 
commissioners will foster collegiality, uniform and coherent circuit Jaw, certainty 
and predictability as well as properly rationalize federalization and regionalism is 
even more complicated. For example, this exercise would necessitate multi-factor, 
and somewhat subjective, evaluation of many rather esoteric concepts while 
demanding speculation, and perhaps political determinations,117 about the 
effectiveness of an essentially untested mechanism. 
Federalization and regionalism, notions that substantiate the commission 
divisional arrangement,118 concomitantly illustrate the potential need to select 
among numerous, frequently competing values. For instance, when the important 
circuit responsibility for harmonizing federal law and local policies conflicts with 
the idea (of arguably declining salience) implicating linkages between a discrete 
geographical area and the appeals court forum, regionalism should yield. The 
concept of appellate justice-the expeditious, inexpensive and fair disposition of 
cases119-provides a similar example. Since approximately 1970, expanding 
circuit dockets have apparently compromised the notion of appellate justice and 
the analogous notion of the appellate ideal: the aspiration that courts resolve each 
appeal on the merits 'vith thorough briefing and full oral presentation; close 
consultation, including the circulation of draft opinions, among the three circuit 
115. See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 54, at 215; Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and 
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-64 (1998); O'Scannlain, 
supra note 9, at 315; Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 585 (1995). 
116. Professor Hellman explores these ideas. See sources cited supra note 114; 
see also JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUC1URAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF .APPEALS 93-95 (Federal Judicial Center 1993) (analyzing these ideas and 
Professor Hellman's work). 
117. See EDWARDS ET AL., CoMMENTS, supra note 25 (suggesting that the 
divisional approach is political); supra note 89 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 
divisional approach is the consummate political compromise, although the commission 
expressly disavowed the applicability of politics to the debate over the future of the 
appellate system). 
118. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 36, 49-50; see also supra notes 
99-102 and accompanying text (analyzing federalization and regionalism). 
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. For analyses of prompt, economical and fair 
resolution, see Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Le\•el of Rule: The 
Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995); Carl Tobias, 
The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1264, 
1286 n.90 (1996). 
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judges who hear the case; and the issuance of a written decision which 
comprehensively explains the reasons for the conclusion reached and which is 
printed in the official Federal Reporter series.12° For instance, appellate courts 
currently accord the complete panoply of procedures, particularly oral arguments 
and written determinations that are published in the Federal Reporter, to a 
markedly smaller percentage of appeals, even as the median time required by the 
circuits for terminating all of the cases filed has remained comparatively 
constant.121 The substantial interests that specific parties have in equitable 
appellate disposition and thorough judicial consideration, therefore, can clash, or 
at least be in tension, with prompt and economical dispute resolution. However, 
the appeals courts seem to treat fairly most cases that receive relatively limited 
examination from judges. 122 
These propositions suggest that Congress should provide for the 
systematic collection, analysis and synthesis of enough empirical information to 
ascertain with confidence whether the situations of individual courts, especially 
the Ninth Circuit, are sufficiently severe to justify remediation and, if so, whether 
those solutions designated would work. Legislators must not make important 
decisions about the future of the appeals courts, absent the greatest, feasible 
amount of applicable empirical material respecting the difficulties experienced by 
circuits and the most efficacious responses, much less prescribe unproven 
approaches that could detrimentally affect the delivery of appellate justice. 
Illustrative of inadvisable action lacking empirical support would be passage of 
the bill that would split the Ninth Circuit, introduced by senators in March 2000, 
which Congress did not adopt and which senators and representatives reintroduced 
in February and March 2001 and may seriously consider. 
B. Additional Study 
The earlier critique of the commission report and proposals found that the 
commissioners did not definitely demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit, or any other 
appeals court, presently encounters complications problematic enough to require 
treatment, particularly with measures that appear as impractical and disruptive as 
120. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 70; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, 
supra note 6, at 21-27; see also MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 32-35 (providing the median 
time for resolution). 
121. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23, 70; see also FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23, at 109-10 (analyzing changes in the procedures 
afforded); MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 32-35 (same and providing the median time for 
resolution). 
122. Many of these cases are pursued by pro se litigants or are accurately 
characterized as routine. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-23 (analyzing 
measures that courts used to treat the docket increases); Tobias, supra note 119, at 1273-
74; see also David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 
72, 82-84 (1983) (analyzing routine cases). But see William M. Richman & William L. 
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand 
Tradition, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 273, 275-76 (1996). 
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the commission's recommendations. However, this is not a criticism of the 
commissioners who labored conscientiously to conclude a gigantic assignment and 
who probably accomplished all that is reasonable to ex"Pect in the incredibly short time 
afforded for the study. Lawmakers may never be able to secure perfect infonnation on 
the appellate system, however they should be cautious about premising significant 
modifications in institutions as crucial as the federal intennediate appeals courts 
on the commission report or on the incomplete knowledge currently available. 
Congress has several vehicles available for initiating additional study. First, 
senators and representatives can reauthorize the commission and, thus, effectively 
extend the entity's life, even though numerous lawmakers may be understandably 
reluctant to ask commissioners, who have already devoted a year to examining the 
circuits, to commit even greater time. Second, legislators can instruct an existing 
institution, namely the Federal Judicial Center or the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, to continue the endeavor commenced by the commission. Both 
research arms of the federal courts certainly possess much relevant material and 
expertise, a phenomenon manifested by the assistance the personnel in the Judicial 
Center and Administrative Office rendered the commissioners. However, the 
research bodies may lack sufficient detachment from the Third Branch. Congress 
can also sponsor more searching inquiry, for example, under the aegis of the 
respective Judiciary Committees, but those panels might not have the requisite 
staff, funding and experience. Lawmakers can correspondingly approve a new 
expert entity, which would be independent, and provide this institution enough 
fiscal support and temporal flexibility to finish the important project by building on 
the prior efforts, especially the recent commission work, and by training fresh 
perspectives on the inquiry. The last approach is preferable because the requisite 
staff, funding, expertise, and new viewpoints would be available. 
The assessors must possess considerable independence and expertise, and 
Congress must appropriate resources, particularly time, which will facilitate the 
study's efficient completion. The evaluators should gather, analyze and synthesize 
the maximum possible empirical data on the difficulties that the appeals courts 
confront and then ascertain whether the complications are sufficiently troubling to 
warrant remediation and, if so, develop the widest spectrum of potential solutions. 
For instance, assessors might attempt to determine conclusively, or at least with 
increased assurance, whether Ninth Circuit case precedent is disuniform or 
incoherent, whether the court creates uncertainty or unpredictability or whether the 
circuit's judges are uncollegial. Were the answer to any of these questions 
positive, the evaluators must examine whether the problems discerned derive from 
the court's size and, if so, whether the divisional structure prescribed would be 
responsive. 
Assessors should also institute efforts to improve comprehension of 
federalization, regionalism, appellate justice and the appellate ideal. For example, 
given the apparently decreasing importance of regionalism in a nation 
experiencing accelerated globalization and computerization, does regionalism 
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deserve promotion and, if so, can its inherent tensions with federalization be 
reconciled?123 Are appellate justice's constituents-the expeditious, economical 
and equitable disposition of appeals-similarly incompatible or can they be 
harmonized?124 Is there a realistic expectation of reattaining the appellate ideal 
when the growth in the number of appeals taken by attorneys and parties continues 
to outstrip the resources the justice system has available for thoroughly reviewing 
every district court determination?125 
Those conducting the analysis must first assemble, scrutinize and 
synthesize all of the applicable material previously collected by evaluators, a 
project that should start with the information accumulated by the commission. The 
Ninth Circuit Executive Office, the Federal Judicial Center and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts are obvious sources of relevant material 
regarding the Ninth Circuit. Assessors should also capitalize on the insightful 
research related to the consistency of Ninth Circuit case law that Professor Arthur 
Hellman has conducted by updating his work on uniformi~ in this appellate court 
and by extending the approach to the remaining circuits.126 
Evaluators might comprehensively solicit the views of federal appeals 
and trial court judges, as well as appellate lawyers, on matters such as consistency, 
coherence, certainty, predictability, collegiality, federalization, regionalism and 
appellate justice. For example, assessors may want to interview circuit judges for 
opinions about collegiality, district judges for ideas on certainty and predictability, 
and appellate counsel for perspectives on the speed, cost and fairness of appellate 
resolution. Moreover, all of these individuals should be interviewed for their views 
on the uniformity and coherence of circuit law, federalization and regionalism. 
Evaluators can also probe the core commission thesis that smaller decisional units, 
especially divisions, foster practically all of the above-listed attributes in several 
ways. First, assessors might compare bench and bar perceptions in appeals courts 
consisting of many or few members and scrutinize recent First Circuit operation and 
rather cursory Fifth and Ninth Circuit application of structural regimes that 
resemble divisions during the late 1970s.127 
However, there are certain reasons why evaluators should pursue 
additional avenues. The opinions of some federal courts observers, including 
judges and appellate practitioners, can be intrinsically limited by the self-interest 
and experiences of those individuals, while the Fifth and Ninth Circuit 
123. See supra notes 99-102, 118 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text. It would also be helpful to 
enhance appreciation of certainty and predictability, but their esoteric nature complicates 
this effort. 
125. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. They might similarly use recent 
work on the en bane process. See generally Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and 
Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213 (1999). 
127. See Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29 (1990); supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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experimentation may not be extensive or apposite enough to serve as an accurate 
indicator of smaller appeals courts' comparative efficacy, much less to function as 
a trustworthy predictor of how the divisional arrangement would actually work.128 
Assessors, accordingly, might monitor particular cases from the time when 
attorneys and litigants institute them until circuits tenninate the appeals, a form of 
inquiiy that can elucidate whether decisional entities with fewer judges are 
preferable and whether appellate court disposition is consistent, coherent, prompt, 
inexpensive and equitable. For example, evaluators can attempt to pinpoint the 
relevance, if any, of Ninth Circuit magnitude or the reasons why that court's 
resolution seems relatively fast in terms of certain parameters but rather 
inexpeditious vis-a-vis other criteria. More specifically, why does the Ninth 
Circuit most promptly resolve appeals after submission at oral argument, while 
being the third slowest court to reach final resolution after the notice of appeal's 
filing? Can assessors identify, and the court properly address, the phenomena 
which are responsible for less prompt decisionmaking?129 The effort to track 
individual cases from filing through disposition might also illuminate whether 
Ninth Circuit reliance on the limited en bane mechanism to perform the court's en 
bane responsibilities is satisfactoiy. For instance, evaluators can analyze the 
limited en bane technique by ascertaining whether the Ninth Circuit reconsiders a 
substantially smaller percentage of appeals than other appellate courts. If so, they 
can determine whether rehearing's infrequency correlates with a comparatively 
high incidence of erroneous panel decisionmaking or with a relatively significant 
rate of disunifonni~ inside the Ninth Circuit or between this appeals court and the 
remaining circuits.1 0 
Finally, should the assessors definitively conclude that the current 
circumstances of any appellate court deserve attention, the evaluators ought to 
explore the broadest feasible array of applicable solutions. Valuable sources for 
constructive approaches include the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, its predecessors-namely the Long Range Planning 
Committee of the United States Judicial Conference, the Federal Courts Study 
Committee and the Hruska Commission-as well as federal appellate courts 
scholars, all of whom have thoroughly canvassed an enormous number of rather 
conventional measures and numerous comparatively innovative possibilities.131 
Assessors might also consult relevant experiences of the appeals courts, most 
prominently the Ninth Circuit, which have permanently effectuated, or have 
128. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (analyzing the limitations); see 
also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 50 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit measure is 
inapposite); supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text (suggesting the difficulties entailed 
in performing the analysis that I propose). 
129. See supra note 34. 
130. For a helpful example of this type of work, see George, supra note 126. 
131. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-25, 59-74; FEDERAL COURTS 
STUDY COMM. REP., supra note 23, at 109-23; HRUSKA COMM'N, supra note 35, at 234-43; 
LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 67-70, 131-33; BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra 
note 6, at 106-286. 
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experimented for many years with, a plethora of salutary mechanisms. These 
devices include various alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR) and somewhat 
refined appellate docket management techniques, like screening panels comprised 
of three judges who normally terminate approximately 160 cases each month 
through the invocation of abbreviated procedures.132 
In short, evaluators must undertake efforts to clarify the important, 
unclear dimensions of the report and recommendations that the Commission 011 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals recently published. 
Assessors should also ascertain more conclusively whether the conditions of specific 
appellate courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, necessitate remediation and, if so, 
designate the finest solutions for the individual appeals courts and for the entire 
system. 
The above-stated propositions, especially regarding courts' circumstance 
and measures for improvement, mean that authorizing additional study would now 
be the best course of action. The commissioners produced insufficient persuasive 
evidence to indicate that the situation of the Ninth Circuit is serious enough to 
justify treatment such as implementing the essentially untested and potentially 
ineffective divisional organization. The federal intermediate appellate courts are too 
crucial to warrant major alteration without a more compelling demonstration of 
severe problems. Nonetheless, members of Congress may reject further study and 
institute reform. Quite a few lawmakers might find appropriate deference to, or be 
concerned about second-guessing, the entity, which they commissioned and which 
expended one year evaluating the circuits and compiling a report and proposals. 
Other senators and representatives may believe that now is the time to act because 
the situation is so grave, because the appellate system has received adequate 
analysis, or because there is enough information to at least proceed cautiously. 
C. Experimentation 
Congress might pass the suggested statute devised by the commissioners 
exactly as the commission crafted the recommended legislation, or Congress may 
modify this iteration. However, the commissioners did not definitively show that 
any appeals court, including the Ninth Circuit, experiences difficulties sufficiently 
troubling to require attention. Even had the commission better substantiated the 
need for change, the commissioners failed to demonstrate how the responses 
which they proposed would be efficacious. 
Lawmakers must accord all of the appellate courts much flexibility to 
experiment with a myriad of solutions for the specific complications that the 
132. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31; J, S. CECIL, 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
INNOVATIONS PROJECT 55-70 (Federal Judicial Center 1985) (discussing innovations in the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); Hellman, RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 114; Hug, 
supra note 42, at 301-02; Wallace, supra note 42, at 944; see generally EVALUATION COMM. 
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98; infra note 163 and accompanying text (analyzing ADR). 
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circuits confront If appeals courts can tailor remedies to their particular 
circumstances, the arrangement should foster development of the most effective 
alternatives. Legislators and judges ought to remember that no single course of 
action will prove equally felicitous in every circuit, while appellate courts could 
well discover that superior approaches exist only after experiencing a number of 
false starts and completing considerable testing. 
Senators and representatives, therefore, must eschew the recommended 
statute written by the commission in the measure's precise formulation but might 
recalibrate the proposed legislation pursuant to the earlier criticisms. Congress 
should essentially prescribe measures that will enable the appeals courts to resolve 
cases as consistently, coherently, promptly, economically and equitably as the 
circuits can and that will have little detrimental impact on appellate court 
operations. Lawmakers could specifically implement these ideas by authorizing 
circumscribed Ninth Circuit experimentation with efficacious mechanisms that 
address continued caseload growth and the more pressing problems identified by 
the commissioners and that would incorporate the most desirable facets of the 
commission suggestions. Legislators, accordingly, may want to integrate several 
beneficial aspects of the commission prescriptions with certain helpful 
recommendations in Chief Judge Rug's cogent response to the tentative draft 
report and with numerous constructive suggestions developed by the Evaluation 
Committee he appointed in early 1999. 
Congress should expressly reject the commissioners' proffered divisional 
en bane concept while retaining circuit-wide stare decisis and substituting some 
form of circuit-wide review, which is premised on the criteria governing en bane 
reconsideration in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, for the Circuit Division. 
The pertinent portions of the Rule state that "rehearing is not favored and 
ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en-bane consideration is necessary to 
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding 
involves a question of exceptional importance."133 The changes I suggest would 
promote consistent and coherent circuit law and perhaps foster certainty and 
predictability, in part by replacing requirements, such as the relatively imprecise 
commission articulation of "conflict," which would invoke Circuit Division 
jurisdiction, with the Rule 35 standards, which have acquired rather clear meaning 
or which at least can be particularized by consulting individual appeals courts' 
application of that procedural stricture.134 
Senators and representatives might correspondingly empower the Ninth 
Circuit to reform the limited en bane device, a technique that appellate court has 
133. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also HELLMAN COMMENTS, supra note 75 
(suggesting a similar approach); see generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The 
Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008 (1991); Michael Soliminc, 
Ideology and En Banc Review, 61 N.C. L. REV. 29 (1988). 
134. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. The changes would also 
avoid the commission articulation's detrimental effects, such as satellite litigation and 
unnecessary expense and delay. 
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applied for twenty years but which none of the remaining appeals courts has 
deployed. The Ninth Circuit could increase somewhat the comparatively few cases 
currently reheard en bane and enlarge the eleven-judge limited en bane tribunal to 
thirteen decisionmakers, consisting of four members stationed in each division 
contemplated by the commissioners and the Ninth Circuit chief judge. 135 These 
modifications, the first of which the court has adopted, would treat criticisms that 
the Ninth Circuit maintains insufficient uniformity and coherence because 
reconsideration's infrequency clarifies too few panel determinations and because 
the present limited en bane court's size allows six members, who may not be 
representative of the entire circuit, to speak for twenty-eightjudges. 136 
Lawmakers as well might authorize Ninth Circuit experimentation with 
adjudicatory divisions, the keystone of the divisional structure, which the appellate 
court could model principally on the recommendation developed by the 
commissioners. The Ninth Circuit might constitute three-judge panels in the 
manner championed by Chief Judge Hug, although the method proposed by the 
commissioners might prove weferable because it may harmonize better 
regionalism and federalization. 37 Under the scheme I am suggesting, appeals 
court judges in the divisions envisioned by the commissioners could assume 
special responsibility for cultivating intracircuit consistency. More specifically, the 
jurists might circulate to each divisional member draft copies of all opinions, thus 
permitting every colleague to raise potential conflicts before the divisions release 
final determinations; this practice would closely resemble the approach that many 
of the appellate courts currently follow and that some of these tribunals have 
instituted during the last decade. 138 Judges could also be particularly sensitive to 
the possible creation of disuniformity and exercise substantial restraint by, for 
instance, evincing considerable respect for the decisions which the other two 
divisions issue. 
135. See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing both the notion that fewer than a 
majority of the active circuit judges might activate the process and the en bane court's 
enlargement); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 52 n.111 (suggesting that fewer than a 
majority of the active circuit judges might activate the process); HUG COMMENTS, supra 
note 75 (proposing the en bane court's enlargement); supra note 98 (stating that the court 
has endorsed both ideas) JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 25 (same), 
136. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also EVALUATION COMM. 
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98, at 2-6 (stating that the Committee has proposed, and the 
court has adopted, the first idea and several others for improving the limited en bane 
process); HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit is amenable to 
change). Most of the changes that I propose would also promote federalization. 
137. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note I, at 51-52; see also supra notes 103-
07 and accompanying text (analyzing the commission criticisms of Chief Judge Hug's 
proposal). 
138. See HUG COMMENTS, supra note 75; JUSTICE DEP'T COMMENTS, supra note 
25; see also EVALUATION COMM. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 98, at 6-10 (stating that the 
Committee has suggested and the court has adopted several other ideas for maintaining 
consistency); MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 97-98 (analyzing the circuits' implementation 
of this practice). 
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The Ninth Circuit should continue employing a number of measures, such as 
bankruptcy appellate panels and sophisticated appeals management processes, 
which have enabled it to manage the biggest docket effectively and to serve as an 
experimental laboratory for larger tribunals. The Ninth Circuit might also test 
certain concepts, including two-judge and district court appellate panels (DCAP), 
apart from the divisional organization recommended by the commission.139 The 
Evaluation Committee should correspondingly continue to study the Ninth Circuit 
and to fonnulate efficacious proposals for improvement Concepts proffered by 
the committee but not mentioned above include techniques for enhancing 
regionalism, communications and collegiality, such as regional assignments that 
require one judge from the administrative unit out of which the appeal arises to bear 
the case. Another consists of devices for increasing productivity and expediting 
review, namely greater "batching" of cases that involve similar issues or 
statutes.140 The ideas recommended would promote unifonnity and coherence, 
would foster certainty and predictability and would appear to rationalize 
federalization and regionalism appropriately. 
The experimentation should proceed for a sufficient period, perhaps for 
the commissioners' suggested eight-year-time frame, 141 and should appear in 
enough diverse contexts to ascertain as conclusively as is practicable the 
effectiveness of the techniques tested by appeals courts. An independent, expert 
entity, such as the RAND Corporation, which recently completed a thorough 
examination of procedures intended by Congress to decrease cost and delay and 
which all ninety-four federal district courts applied pursuant to the Civil Justice 
Refonn Act of 1990, 142 must rigorously scrutinize the experimentation undertaken 
by appellate courts. As previously stated, assessors should systematically 
assemble, analyze and synthesize the maximum quantity of dependable empirical 
infonnation. The evaluators should also consult the recommendations regarding 
further study that were posited in the above subsection. Illustrative is the need to 
determine (1) whether the divisional arrangement actually promotes consistent and 
139. See COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 1, at 62-66 (analyzing the DCAPs and 
two-judge panels); Gordon Bennant & Judy Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth 
Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 181 (1989); supra note 130 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that the circuit explore ways to expedite resolution); supra note 132 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the Ninth Circuit measures); cf. infra note 143 (proposing 
that other circuits test these and additional measures); infra notes 164-65 and 
accompanying text (criticizing these panels). 
140. See EVALUATION CoMMl1TEE INTERIM REPORT, s11pra note 98, at 12-17. 
Senate Bill 1403 would have required regional assignments. 
141. See COMMISSION REPORT, s11pra note 1, at 95; b11t sees. 253, § 2E, 106th 
Cong. (1999). 
142. See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE, AN EVALUATIO~~ 
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND 
COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIV. JUSTICE, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON COURTS 
(1996); see also COMMISSION REPORT, s11pra note 1, at 42-43 (proposing that the FJC 
conduct the study). 
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coherent circuit law as well as certainty and predictability; (2) whether the approach 
facilitates prompt, economical and equitable disposition; and (3) whether it fosters 
collegiality and rationalizes federalization and regionalism in an acceptable fashion. 
Once the testing prescribed bas transpired and bas received comprehensive 
assessment, senators and representatives should be able to delineate with 
somewhat greater precision any difficulties which deserve long-term treatment and 
should be able to designate the best solutions. Lawmakers can then enact 
legislation to effectuate any permanent changes which are clearly indicated.143 
D. Additional Suggestions 
Congress might carefully consider the implementation of numerous 
actions in addition to, or complementary to, the framework for previously 
proffered experimentation. Each appellate court has apparently faced, and could 
confront, burgeoning appeals with inadequate resources to decide all of the cases as 
unifonnly, coherently, expeditiously, inexpensively and fairly as is ideal. Every circuit 
may also have encountered, and might well experience, other difficulties-
including certain complications, such as inconsistency and incoherence seemingly 
identified by the commissioners, which principally involve docket growth. 
Lawmakers, therefore, have available two major options. Senators and 
representatives can authorize approaches with the goal of reducing the volume of ' 
appeals that attorneys and litigants contemplate taking, and if that alternative proves 
deficient, can empower the federal judiciary to apply mechanisms directly to 
address the increasing number of cases that are actually filed in a uniform, coherent, 
prompt, economical and equitable manner that minimally disrupts appellate court 
administration. 
A substantial percentage of the actions that solons can evaluate and may 
institute would implicate the proposals regarding experimentation which were 
examined previously in this subsection. However, none of the ideas explored 
below is a panacea, or would apparently be superior, for reasons that are primarily 
related to practicality and efficacy. Indeed, the comparatively lukewarm reception 
which the legislative and judicial branches have accorded to most of the concepts, 
since the time that federal intermediate appellate courts were dramatically altered 
by docket growth, may attest to the relative infeasibility and ineffectiveness of the 
measures. 
The quintessential way to decrease escalating appeals would be 
restriction of the federal district courts' present expansive criminal and civil 
jurisdiction. Circuit Judge Merritt, whom Justice White joined, broached one feature 
143. I focus on the Ninth Circuit, but Congress might authorize, and encourage, 
testing in other courts. For example, circuits, namely the Fifth and Eleventh with growing 
dockets, could test DCAPs and two-judge panels, while the Federal Circuit might resolve 
tax or social security appeals. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; infra note 152 
and accompanying text. The controversial nature of the authority issue and the changes 
suggest that Congress should expressly authorize them. 
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fundamental to the civil constituent of this response in "additional views" 
appended to the commission report.144 The jurists encouraged senators and 
representatives to circumscribe diversity of citizenship jurisdiction by preserving 
such jurisdiction only when "parties can show a concrete need for a f ederol 
forum ... because (1) of the existence oflocal influence that threatens piudice to an 
out-of.state litigant, or (2) of the complex nature of interstate litigation."1 s However, 
numerous perceptive observers of the federal appellate courts and of Congress are 
not particularly sanguine about the prospects for success irt attempting to limit 
criminal or civil jurisdiction as a general proposition or the diversity of citizenship 
concept specifically.146 For instance, throughout the 1990s, legisliltors seemed to 
federalize less criminal behavior than in the preceding decade and to recognize 
fewer new civil causes of action than during the 1960s and 1970s.147 Lawmakers 
also have cabined some civil jurisdiction, which involves most importantly cases 
pursued by incarcerated irtdividuals.148 Nonetheless, solons did pass the quite 
comprehensive Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and a 
large number of rather insignificant criminal statutes throughout the decade as 
well as the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which authorized comparatively broad-ranging civil causes of action.'4j 
Moreover, it is helpful to understand that many members of Congress apparently 
experience considerable difficulty resisting the essentially cost-free political 
benefits, which can frequently accrue from federalizing additional areas of 
criminal behavior and from creating civil causes of action. 
Of course, the United States Supreme Court might confine the 
thoroughgoing crimirtal and civil jurisdiction that federal district courts currently 
possess, should lawmakers decide agairtst narrowing either component of the 
federal justice process. Over the last several decades, the High Court has gradually 
tightened abstention, the justiciability doctrirtes, including mootness and ripeness, 
144. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 77-88. 
145. Id. at 80. For analyses of similar approaches, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra 
note 35, at 134; MCKENNA, supra note 116, at 141-53. 
146. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 127, at 34-37; Martha Dragich, Once A 
Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of tlze Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996 Wis. L. 
REV. 11, 16-17; William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 719, 722-25 (1995). 
147. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); National 
Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970); Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970). 
148. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-32, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Prison Litigation Refonn Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996): Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). 
149. See Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-155, 110 Stat. 
1392 (1996); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 102-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(1990). 
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and analogous devices, even though relatively stringent application can preclude 
merits-based resolution and can marginal~ reduce appellate filings, even were 
stricter enforcement less problematic. 15 In short, legislative contraction of 
jurisdiction is not a productive near-term or permanent solution, as Congress is 
more likely to expand federal criminal and civil law, while judicially-imposed 
restrictions are inadvisable because they may curtail federal court access too 
sharply and may minimally limit the total number of appeals in any event. 
Other approaches, which could decrease the surging cases that counsel 
and clients think they might bring before the circuits, seem similarly impractical or 
inefficacious. Illustrative is the possibility of making appellate court review 
discretionary. The commissioners were unconvinced that express discretionary 
jurisdiction for every appeal is wise. They found the notion "runs too counter to 
the now prevalent" view, whereby a losing party should have one opportunity to 
persuade an appellate court that the district judge has committed prejudicial error, 
even though the commission explicitly acknowledged that the truncated appeals 
court procedures which are scrutinized in this Article have "blurred the distinction 
between obligatory and discretionary review."151 Federal courts observers 
correspondingly may believe that lawmakers can restrict swelling appellate 
dockets through expansion of the jurisdiction exercised by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit since the appellate court's 1982 creation, 
Indeed, the commissioners did explore the chief reasons that favor centralizing 
appeals court review of social security and tax matters in the Federal Circuit but 
designated no new categories of cases which solons might fruitfully assign to the 
appellate court. A close examination of appeals' potential diversion from the twelve 
regional circuits reveals that this prospect would effect no actual reduction in 
filings, because the appellate judiciary as a whole would continue processing the 
identical quantity of cases.152 
150. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 544 (1969); 
Dragich, supra note 146, at 16-17. Of course, judicial invalidation of statutes affords 
another, albeit limited, way of narrowing jurisdiction. See United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The discussion in this and 
the next sentence principally implicates civil jurisdiction. 
151. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note l, at 70-72; see also 28 u.s.c. § 1291 
(1994). For analyses of the relevant history, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, 
at 234-38; Dragich, supra note 146, at 52-54; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 238-
40; supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
152. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 72-74. Because the Federal 
Circuit has little special expertise in the social security or tax areas, this approach may not 
expedite appeals, yield systemic economies or be fairer to litigants. See JUSTICE DEPT. 
COMMENTS, supra note 25; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 234; see also BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 222-27 (analyzing other ways to decrease appeals); 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 67-70 (analyzing bankruptcy appeals' treatment); 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 72 (describing the court as an innovative change); 
Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 234-35 (analyzing other ways to decrease appeals). 
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The apparent dearth of salutary remedies to restrict the upward spiral of 
appeals means that the principal alternative remaining would be to treat directly 
those docket increases that actually materialize in a uniform, coherent, 
expeditious, inexpensive and fair fashion and that disturb efficacious appellate 
court functioning as little as possible. One obvious, albeit rather controversial, 
response would be the augmentation of circuit resources by supplementing extra-
judicial support, by enhancing staff duties or by adding appeals court judgeships. 
An inexorable rise in filings led the Judicial Conference of the United States to ask 
that Congress approve ten more appellate members for the Ninth Circuit during 1993, 
although the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council recently limited the request to five 
judges. 
Establishing additional appellate judgeships, expanding the number of 
administrative personnel or expanding the responsibilities that appeals courts 
assign to administrative personnel could facilitate the resolution of numerous 
cases, but each approach might entail several, comparatively important 
disadvantages. Enlarging non-judicial support or staff obligations could further 
bureaucratize the appeals courts and concomitantly diminish appellate judges' 
visibility and accountability.153 The prospect of increasing the already significant 
size of the federal bench: (1) has fueled the controversy over the Ninth Circuit's 
bifurcation; (2) might be inefficient and accentuate a few difficulties, namely too 
little collegiality, which the commissioners perceived; and (3) would provoke 
vociferous opposition from many members of the Third Branch, even if the United 
States Senate and the President could more felicitously confinn nominees for all of 
the judicial positions that senators and representatives would authorize.154 
Legislative approval of substantially more new judgeships might also yield little 
permanent improvement because the solution primarily serves as a braking 
measure which can exacerbate certain detrimental features, such as inadequate 
intracircuit consistency, insufficient manageability of the en bane procedure and 
deficient collegiality, which federal courts observers have asserted may accompany 
the administration of large appeals courts and which can ultimately raise the 
controversial issue of circuit-splitting.155 
153. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
27-28 (1985) (discussing the growth of non-:judicial support, but coming to the opposite 
conclusion); CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF - INTEREsT: FEDERAL JUDGES ANO 
COURT ADMINISTRATION 94-121 (1995). For analyses of these increases and their 
disadvantages, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-25 and MCKENNA, supra note 
116, at49-55. 
154. See Gordon Bennant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the 
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); Dragich, supra note 146, 
at 45-49; Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of DMded Go,•emment, 41 
EMORY L. J. 527 (1998) [hereinafter Tobias, Dividedj. 
155. See, e.g., BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 202; Tobias, 
Impoverished, supra note 6, at 1388-89; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 235; see also 
WILLIAM P. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984) (concluding that 
increasing judgeships may not yield pennanent improvement); supra note 3. 
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A readily available option that would address multiplying appellate 
caseloads, but would minimize some vexing problems mentioned above and that 
could easily be implemented by the Senate and the Chief Executive, is to fill all of 
the existing appeals and district court judicial vacancies, especially those seats on 
the Ninth Circuit which have remained empty over a considerable period. For 
much of the 1990s, the Ninth Circuit operated absent the complete complement of 
twenty-eight active appellate court judges authorized by Congress, and for much 
of the time since 1995, when the most recent circuit-division effort began, 
fun . d 0 th . l f . b h0 156 Th. ctione w1 out approximate y one-quarter o tts mem ers tp. ts 
predicament forced the circuit to cancel 600 oral arguments in 1997, imposed 
unnecessaty expense and delay on the appellate court, circuit judges, practitioners 
and parties, and required the court to depend even more on decisionmakers other 
than active appeals court members when staffing three-:judge panels. 157 Indeed, the 
commissioners discovered that 43 percent of the panels, which the Ninth Circuit 
constituted for cases that it terminated after oral argument during the 1997 fiscal 
year, had at least one participant who was not an active member of the court. This 
statistic compares rather unfavorably with the national average of thirty-three 
percent. 158 The phenomenon of placing substantial reliance on visiting judges 
might undermine consistency, coherence, collegiality, regionalism and appellate 
justice. Assuming for the purposes of argument that mastery of circuit precedent 
and collegiality promote uniform and coherent law as well as speedy, economical 
and equitable resolution, jurists who are not active members of an ~peals court 
are less likely to have this command of precedent and to be collegial.1 
Guaranteeing that the Ninth Circuit has available the entire contingent of 
congressionally-authorized, active appellate judges to perform the burdensome 
judicial duties assigned would, therefore, seemingly improve the court's present 
circumstances. Affording the Ninth Circuit the total membership to which that 
court is entitled could rectify or at least ameliorate quite a few difficulties, such as 
too little uniformity, coherence, and collegiality, and might provide important 
benefits, such as prompt, inexpensive and fair appellate disposition. In any event, 
156. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 30; HUFSTEDLER COMMENTS, 
supra note 64; Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR Ass'N COMMENTS, supra note 64; Carl Tobias, 
The Judicial Vacancy Conundrom in the Ninth Circuit, 63 BROOK L. REV. 1283 (1997). 
157. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth 
Circuit, 19 REv. Lmo. 233 (2000) [hereinafter Tobias, Openings]; Viveca Novak, Empty· 
Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puls Lives, 
Justice on Hold, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A9; see also Bill Kisliuk, Judges' 
Conference Clams Circuit-Splilling Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 
(analyzing the problems that the vacancies create). 
158. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 31. For analyses of circuit reliance 
on visiting judges, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 198-201, MCKENNA, 
supra note 116, at 38-39, and Herald, supra note 12, at 466. 
159. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 54, 157-58 
and accompanying text (suggesting that panels without three active circuit judges further 
decreases the prospect of securing the small, stable decisional units proposed by the 
commission). 
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it would be worthwhile to implement efforts to clarify whether some 
complications, which the commission ostensibly found and which observers of the 
court have purportedly discerned, result from inability to secure timely judicial 
appointments for the Ninth Circuit's twenty-eight active positions. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee, which bas historically exercised, and 
now maintains, substantial responsibility for the judicial confinnation process, 
might help fill the three, current vacancies on the Ninth Circuit by cooperating 
with President George W. Bush as the panel did with President Bill Clinton during 
1998, an endeavor that figured prominentlg;; in the appointment of sixty-five judges 
for the appellate and district court bencb.1 0 President Clinton seemingly consulted 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utab), the Judiciary Committee chair, and additional 
committee members before announcing nominations while working closely with 
Republican and Democratic senators and with political leaders from the states 
having judicial openings to foster expeditious confirmation of the candidates 
submitted. The Senate and President Bush could extend this approach by 
attempting to facilitate the approval of judges for the 100 seats that are presently 
vacant Nevertheless, relatively few current appellate openings are outside of the 
Ninth Circuit, and judicial selection has proceeded rather slowly at the outset of a 
new administration and of the 107th Congress, especially with a slight Democratic 
majority in the Senate. Moreover, some inherent problems will naturally slow the 
process. 
Another straightforward, yet controversial, means of directly combatting 
swollen dockets would be greater constriction of the shrinking procedural 
opportunities that appellate courts accord counsel and litigants filing cases.161 For 
instance, the circuits might reduce even more the dwindling percentage of appeals 
that receive thorough judicial consideration, particularly in the fonn of oral 
arguments and written detenninations. This solution would lead to prompt and 
economical resolution but could jeopardize equitable disposition and could further 
erode judges' visibility and accountability as well as public acceptability of 
appellate court decisionmaking.162 Additional responses that frontally attack 
expanding circuit caseloads appear equally infeasible or inefficacious, partly 
because they might have several deleterious side effects. Illustrative are the various 
alternatives to dispute resolution, namely arbitration and mediation, 163 and appeals 
160. See Carl Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. 
REv. 315 (1999). But cf. Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton 
Administration, 52 RurGERS L. REY. 833 (2000) (finding that less cooperation led to 35 
appointments in 1999); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 
19 LAW & INEQ. J. 159 (2001) (finding that less cooperation led to 39 appointments in 
2000). For analyses of judicial selection in the nation and in the Ninth Circuit, sec Bennant, 
supra note 154, Tobias, Divided, supra note 154, and Tobias, Openings, supra note 157. 
161. See supra note 120 and accompanying text 
162. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text For analyses of declining 
visibility and accountability, see supra notes 151, 153 and accompanying text. 
163. See, e.g., JAMES B. EAGLIN, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-ARGUMENT 
CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN 1lIB SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATIO~ (1990); 
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court panels that do not consist of three circuit judges, such as district court 
appellate, and two-judge, panels.164 These devices could promote the rather 
expeditious and inexpensive disposition of many cases, although some types of 
ADR and panels without three appeals court members can similarly threaten fair 
circuit decisionmakin§ and undermine the accountability and visibility of the 
appellate judiciary.16 Indeed, the chief judges of seven regional circuits, who 
submitted public comments during November 1998 on the commissioners' tentative 
draft report, delivered a caustic critique of the commission suggestions respecting 
district court appellate panels, characterizing those recommendations as "flawed both 
conceptually and practically."166 
In short, lawmakers might evaluate closely, and consider authorizing, 
certain actions apart from, or complementary to, the proposals regarding appeals 
court experimentation previously assessed. However, legislators might find them 
impractical or ineffective and, therefore reject a substantial number of those 
measures that would apparently decrease the volume of cases which attorneys and 
parties plan to pursue, and, failing that, which would directly address the appeals 
actually brought in a consistent, coherent, prompt, economical and equitable 
manner. 
Several reasons suggest that senators and representatives, as well as the 
federal judiciary, should implement the ideas enumerated above. The 
recommendations constitute a cautious, constructive attempt to ascertain with 
greater confidence whether the current situation of the Ninth Circuit in fact 
requires remediation and, if so, to delineate potentially efficacious solutions. The 
approach should treat the most troubling problems that the commissioners perceived 
and the valid concerns that numerous federal appellate courts observers-
including many members of Congress who represent jurisdictions in the western 
United States-have expressed about the Ninth Circuit. The proposals could 
confirm the legitimacy of the commission determinations and of contested criticisms 
that others have leveled at the appeals court. The suggestions correspondingly 
ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1997). For analyses of Alternative Dispute Resolution, sec 
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 139, 187; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 
230. 
164. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 131-32; MCKENNA, supra note 
116, at 127-33. For analyses of these panels, see Dragich, supra note 146, at 58-62 and supra 
notes 132, 140 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. For analyses of other direct 
responses, see BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 151-85, 229-86; Dragich, s11pra 
note 146, at 49-52; 55-66; Tobias, Suggestions, supra note 8, at 231-33, 236-38. 
166. EDWARDS ET AL., COMMENTS, supra note 25. The proposal rested on the 
"flawed premise that cases are easily divisible into two categories"-error correction and 
Jaw declaration-and would add another level of review for most cases, which would be 
"expensive to litigants and unacceptable." It would burden the courts, might require more 
"district judgeships for appellate purposes, which does not seem to be good public policy," 
and would engender "virtually monolithic opposition by district judges.'' Id.; accord 
JUSTICE DEPT. COMMENTS, supra note 25. 
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might help probe the effectiveness of the divisional arrangement developed by the 
commissioners and of additional techniques, namely panels constituting fewer 
than three appellate judges, which would apparently be responsive to docket 
growth. This manner of proceeding should achieve certain, important commission 
objectives, such as the promotion of uniformity and coherence, without disrupting 
those aspects of Ninth Circuit administration that have facilitated the rather 
expeditious, inexpensive and fair resolution of cases. The recommendations would 
explicitly address several concerns, such as the need to rationalize federalization in an 
appropriate fashion, and would accommodate a few commission ideas, namely the 
notion of smaller, stabler decisional units. Some of the commissioners' goals, such 
as fostering regionalism, which these prescriptions may only partially promote, 
seem less significant. Of course, if the legislative or judicial branch decides to 
effectuate the concepts proffered, implementation would limit the disadvantages 
that the essentially untested divisional scheme could impose. Finally, should the 
course of action outlined prove to be inadequate, the incremental, conservative 
character of the approach minimizes the risks entailed and means that 
comparatively little would have been lost, while lawmakers and judges can then 
institute relatively radical mechanisms, if the techniques are indicated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals carefully discharged its important responsibilities to analyze the appellate 
court system and propose improvements in the circumscribed period which 
lawmakers provided. However, insufficient empirical data support the 
commissioners' findings and suggestions. As the twenty-first century opens, 
therefore, the 107th Congress should authorize further study of the appeals courts 
or should authorize Ninth Circuit experimentation with measures that promise to 
enhance appellate court operations while rejecting the recently-reintroduced bills 
to split the Ninth Circuit 
